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The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Jacob Ross This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... of the “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view of the deontic concept of moral rightness that ties it closely to blameworthiness...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... counterfactuals can yield an appropriate notion of causal redundancy and argues for a negative answer. Second, it examines how this issue bears on the mental causation debate. In particular, it considers the argument that the overdetermination problem simply does not arise on a dependency conception of causation...
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The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 201–242.
Published: 01 April 2010
...Julia Markovits This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
...David E. Taylor This essay argues that deflationism (about truth and reference) is incompatible with the phenomenon of referential indeterminacy (RI). This puts the deflationist in the difficult position of having to deny the possibility of what otherwise seems like a manifest and theoretically...
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Andy Clark How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 1–58.
Published: 01 January 2015
....” The traditional interpretation regards the distinction between the two notions as reflecting a distinction between indeterminate space and determinations of space by the understanding, respectively. By contrast, a recent influential reading has argued that the two notions can be fused into one and that space...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... is equivalent to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief. Although the logical closure of belief and the Lockean thesis are attractive postulates in themselves, initially this may seem like a formal “curiosity”; however, as will be argued in the rest of the essay, a very reasonable theory...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to the specification of this relation. Several difficulties with such analyses have led many philosophers to reject the possibility of an adequate resemblance account of depiction. This essay outlines these difficulties and argues that current resemblance accounts succumb to them. It then develops an alternative...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 225–240.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Mark Eli Kalderon In Fear of Knowledge , Paul Boghossian argues against the very coherence of epistemic relativism. This essay does two things. First, without questioning the truth of his conclusion, it argues that Boghossian's argument for that conclusion fails. Second, it argues that the avowed...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. The argument proceeds...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Ian Proops One of the main arguments Russell offers for the Theory of Descriptions in “On Denoting” is that it can be used to solve a puzzle about substitutivity. This article argues that, owing to a widespread mischaracterization of the substitutivity principle Russell means to be defending...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (4): 533–569.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Jonathan Cottrell This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise , Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions...
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (3): 293–336.
Published: 01 July 2019
...Colin Chamberlain Consider the distinctive qualitative property grass visually appears to have when it visually appears to be green. This property is an example of what I call sensuous color . Whereas early modern mechanists typically argue that bodies are not sensuously colored, Margaret Cavendish...
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
..., the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 55–93.
Published: 01 January 2012
... to this answer and surveys some weaker answers and rejects them. Next, it proposes an answer, which appeals to the “Dragging Condition.” After explaining and arguing for its use of the Dragging Condition, the essay argues that the Dragging Condition provides a general account of, and solution...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 317–358.
Published: 01 July 2012
... these issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues that this conflict does arise and that it creates problems...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 189–214.
Published: 01 April 2013
... determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed to perform. This essay argues...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
... it means for an individual x to value ϕ under any conditions. Though there has been some disagreement, most subjectivists hold that x values ϕ if and only if x desires ϕ. This essay argues that subjectivists have erred in accepting a desiderative theory of valuing. Instead, it argues that subjectivists...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
... generics more quickly and readily than seemingly simpler quantifiers such as `all' and `some'. I present an account of generics that not only illuminates the strange truth conditions of generics, but also explains how young children find them so comparatively easy to acquire. I then argue that generics...