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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Jacob Ross This essay argues that there is a conflict between the principle of Countable Additivity and standard views of how we should update centered or de se beliefs. The latter views, this essay argues, entail a general principle, which the essay calls the Generalized Thirder Principle, that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 201–242.
Published: 01 April 2010
...Julia Markovits This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view of the deontic concept of moral rightness that ties it closely to blameworthiness...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 205–229.
Published: 01 April 2014
... counterfactuals can yield an appropriate notion of causal redundancy and argues for a negative answer. Second, it examines how this issue bears on the mental causation debate. In particular, it considers the argument that the overdetermination problem simply does not arise on a dependency conception of causation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2017) 126 (1): 43–79.
Published: 01 January 2017
...David E. Taylor This essay argues that deflationism (about truth and reference) is incompatible with the phenomenon of referential indeterminacy (RI). This puts the deflationist in the difficult position of having to deny the possibility of what otherwise seems like a manifest and theoretically...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 183–223.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to the specification of this relation. Several difficulties with such analyses have led many philosophers to reject the possibility of an adequate resemblance account of depiction. This essay outlines these difficulties and argues that current resemblance accounts succumb to them. It then develops an...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 225–240.
Published: 01 April 2009
...Mark Eli Kalderon In Fear of Knowledge , Paul Boghossian argues against the very coherence of epistemic relativism. This essay does two things. First, without questioning the truth of his conclusion, it argues that Boghossian's argument for that conclusion fails. Second, it argues that the avowed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 365–380.
Published: 01 July 2010
... rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal autonomist. The argument proceeds as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 151–205.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Ian Proops One of the main arguments Russell offers for the Theory of Descriptions in “On Denoting” is that it can be used to solve a puzzle about substitutivity. This article argues that, owing to a widespread mischaracterization of the substitutivity principle Russell means to be defending...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2015) 124 (1): 1–58.
Published: 01 January 2015
... traditional interpretation regards the distinction between the two notions as reflecting a distinction between indeterminate space and determinations of space by the understanding, respectively. By contrast, a recent influential reading has argued that the two notions can be fused into one and that space as...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2015) 124 (4): 533–569.
Published: 01 October 2015
...Jonathan Cottrell This essay gives a new interpretation of Hume's second thoughts about minds in the Appendix, based on a new interpretation of his view of composition. In Book 1 of the Treatise , Hume argued that, as far as we can conceive it, a mind is a whole composed by all its perceptions. But...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 131–171.
Published: 01 April 2014
... equivalent to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief. Although the logical closure of belief and the Lockean thesis are attractive postulates in themselves, initially this may seem like a formal “curiosity”; however, as will be argued in the rest of the essay, a very reasonable theory of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Andy Clark How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2008) 117 (3): 323–348.
Published: 01 July 2008
...Eugene Mills Suppose you and I are “human beings” in the sense of human animals , members of the genus Homo . Given this supposition, this article argues first and foremost that (it's at least very plausible that) we originated not at the moment of our biological conception but either before or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 29–57.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Trenton Merricks Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Sydney Shoemaker Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the “Parfit people,” creatures psychologically like us...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2009) 118 (2): 153–181.
Published: 01 April 2009
... wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable. Philosophers deploy this claim in the service of a wide variety of philosophical projects. But Saul Kripke has argued that it is false. According to Kripke, there are necessary connections between distinct existences; in particular, there are...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 449–495.
Published: 01 October 2010
... the soul; second, the identification of the relevant fallacies. This essay examines Kant's account in the First Paralogism of how these two elements combine to produce the doctrine that the soul is a substance. It is argued that Kant has a novel, ingenious—and even somewhat plausible—account of how...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 497–529.
Published: 01 October 2010
...Christopher Tucker The Neo-Moorean Deduction (I have a hand, so I am not a brain-in-a-vat) and the Zebra Deduction (the creature is a zebra, so it isn't a cleverly disguised mule) are notorious. Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Fred Dretske, and Brian McLaughlin, among others, argue that these...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
... action. According to this view, if Jim ought to jam, that is not because there is a special distinctive deliberative ought relation between Jim and jamming; rather, it is because a certain proposition ought to be the case: namely, that Jim jams. This essay defends the naive view, by first arguing that...