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approval

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 321–326.
Published: 01 April 2011
...) and Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Gibbard’s basic idea is that if a sentence expresses a belief, approval, or allegiance to a norm, its negation expresses disagreement with the belief, approval, or allegiance. How Gibbard proposes projecting this idea to the negation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (2): 326–329.
Published: 01 April 2011
...) and Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Gibbard’s basic idea is that if a sentence expresses a belief, approval, or allegiance to a norm, its negation expresses disagreement with the belief, approval, or allegiance. How Gibbard proposes projecting this idea to the negation...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 587–591.
Published: 01 October 2011
... passion Hume offers in the Treatise as the approved motive of just actions once the rules of property and promise are in place, (e) the artificial virtue of chastity and the convention of marriage (with a double standard), and (f) Hume’s close assimilation of promise to property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 591–594.
Published: 01 October 2011
... passion Hume offers in the Treatise as the approved motive of just actions once the rules of property and promise are in place, (e) the artificial virtue of chastity and the convention of marriage (with a double standard), and (f) Hume’s close assimilation of promise to property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 594–598.
Published: 01 October 2011
... passion Hume offers in the Treatise as the approved motive of just actions once the rules of property and promise are in place, (e) the artificial virtue of chastity and the convention of marriage (with a double standard), and (f) Hume’s close assimilation of promise to property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 598–602.
Published: 01 October 2011
...). 594 BOOK REVIEWS (c) Hume’s account of the invention of rights, (d) which passion Hume offers in the Treatise as the approved motive of just actions once the rules of property and promise are in place, (e) the artificial virtue of chastity...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 603–607.
Published: 01 October 2011
... passion Hume offers in the Treatise as the approved motive of just actions once the rules of property and promise are in place, (e) the artificial virtue of chastity and the convention of marriage (with a double standard), and (f) Hume’s close assimilation of promise to property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (4): 607–609.
Published: 01 October 2011
... passion Hume offers in the Treatise as the approved motive of just actions once the rules of property and promise are in place, (e) the artificial virtue of chastity and the convention of marriage (with a double standard), and (f) Hume’s close assimilation of promise to property...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 125–131.
Published: 01 January 2012
... traits and the bare conventionality of justice or honesty is briefly glimpsed when, pressed to explain what is the motivational source of the honest actions we approve, and finding no relevant natural trait, we resort to “reasoning in a circle,” perplexedly citing the approval of honest action itself...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 131–137.
Published: 01 January 2012
..., pressed to explain what is the motivational source of the honest actions we approve, and finding no relevant natural trait, we resort to “reasoning in a circle,” perplexedly citing the approval of honest action itself. Much of the interest of part 1 lies in how Cohon tackles two formidable...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (1): 137–139.
Published: 01 January 2012
... conception of virtue as always rooted in natural character traits and the bare conventionality of justice or honesty is briefly glimpsed when, pressed to explain what is the motivational source of the honest actions we approve, and finding no relevant natural trait, we resort to “reasoning in a circle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 447–452.
Published: 01 July 2011
... articulates accounts of moral approval and disapproval by refer- ence to empathy. The central part of the book then uses these accounts of moral approval and disapproval to address metaethical questions. In what is presented as one of the main accomplishments of the book, Slote first presents a “non...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 452–455.
Published: 01 July 2011
... articulates accounts of moral approval and disapproval by refer- ence to empathy. The central part of the book then uses these accounts of moral approval and disapproval to address metaethical questions. In what is presented as one of the main accomplishments of the book, Slote first presents a “non...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 455–460.
Published: 01 July 2011
... articulates accounts of moral approval and disapproval by refer- ence to empathy. The central part of the book then uses these accounts of moral approval and disapproval to address metaethical questions. In what is presented as one of the main accomplishments of the book, Slote first presents a “non...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 461–467.
Published: 01 July 2011
... articulates accounts of moral approval and disapproval by refer- ence to empathy. The central part of the book then uses these accounts of moral approval and disapproval to address metaethical questions. In what is presented as one of the main accomplishments of the book, Slote first presents a “non...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 247–251.
Published: 01 April 2018
... this fact? Do the grounding facts bottom out in facts about individuals? The following are grounding facts: (i) The MassDOT board is constituted by {Alice, Bob, Carol} at t. (ii) The MassDOT board is in session at t. (iii) Alice voices her approval of raising tolls at t. (iv) Bob voices his...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 122–127.
Published: 01 January 2002
... both of them, thus the dilemma. There may well be a right thing to do under those circumstances, though we wouldn’t say that this sort of action is characteristic of a perfectly vir- tuous person at all—thus, it doesn’t warrant a “tick of approval,” or positive assessment. However, the problem...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (3): 361–364.
Published: 01 July 2022
... some taste for virtue in the form of a proper sense of shame that someone becomes susceptible to moral arguments. We may also wonder whether Aristotle differentiates a kind of shame that is solely preoccupied with people’s approval and disapproval, and the kind of refined sense of shame that aims...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 243–246.
Published: 01 April 2010
... are recognizably stylized in the approved Greek manner—but why should this be Aristotle’s image? For once one wouldn’t go wrong in judging a book by its cover. Remastering Morals provokes the reader to think hard about how to identify the masters we are invited to envision in fruitful, mutually beneficial...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 246–250.
Published: 01 April 2010
... and groups, including ancient Sicily). True, the buttocks of this triskelion are recognizably stylized in the approved Greek manner—but why should this be Aristotle’s image? For once one wouldn’t go wrong in judging a book by its cover. Remastering Morals provokes the reader to think hard about how...