... and less controversial case for response-dependence about the funny. In part 2, it shows the tight analogy between anger and amusement in developing the harder and more controversial case for response-dependence about a kind of blameworthiness (and so response-dependence about a kind of responsibility...

...). In a footnote, Finkel- stein entertains the following objection to (c): Imagine that you occasionally express your unconscious anger toward your sister by speaking in a peculiar, clipped tone of voice. One day, while speaking in this tone of voice, you say, “My therapist tells me...

... out a card, but it is a description Campbell would contest. Contrary to Lynne McFall, who defends bitterness as an appro- priate response to the failure of those at whom one is legitimately angry to respond appropriately to that anger, Campbell draws attention to how the ascription...

... of anger about a moderate number of injuries and insults on a moderate amount of occasions toward a moderate number of people for a moderate length of time” (43). Curzer notes that it has been objected that “the right objects” cannot be expressed quantitatively. Not so, he argues. Feeling fear, say, toward...

..., such as my love for my wife or my enduring anger 132 BOOK REVIEWS at you for publicly embarrassing me last week. Rather, he claims, such “emo- tional attitudes,” as we might call them, comprise a variety of particular epi- sodes...

... and resolution of a single emotion. One emotion often gives way to another: puzzlement to curiosity, curiosity to foreboding, foreboding to horror, horror to grief—or perhaps instead to anger, which gives way to resentment, and so on. Unlike a chain of causation, however, a sequence of emotions has...

... the reactive/nonreactive line. In particular, I do not wish to rule out that some forms of anger should be counted as reactive attitudes on the best account of how to draw this line. Nor do I wish to deny that gratitude and (some forms of) admiration should be so counted; like resentment, indignation...

... of emotion Wollheim has characterized. These are not our characteristic occurrent emotions but rather some underlying dispositions that erupt now and then and may congeal, even crystallize, over a lifetime. One thinks of Ulysses’s anger, Oedipus’s fear, of terror and romantic love in general...

... they are. Echeñique is certainly correct that Aristotle's virtues and vices of character are not restricted to the domain of other-regarding behavior, and that his treatments of voluntariness display no preoccupation with desert, fairness, or such paradigmatic Strawsonian reactive attitudes as anger or resentment. I...

...- vince us that this element can be shorn of its tendency to destructive anger and aggressiveness without nullifying its proper role as the raw material from which courage is made? 95 BOOK REVIEWS These are intriguing questions...

... wife or my enduring anger 132 ...

... evidence for religious matters. Though it is commonplace to acknowledge the way cer- tain passions—intense anger, jealousy, and envy, for example—can cause rea- soning to go off the rails, this fact is seldom acknowledged by evidentialists. Helm’s discussion, however, focuses mainly on the ways...

..., of being in danger) partly constitutive of the passions (anger, fear) are cases of evaluative phantasia as she has analyzed it in part 1. To the objection that the passions of humans, at least, involve evaluative thoughts , Moss, on the basis of slender but suggestive evidence, argues that Aristotle has...

... [certain] seriously nasty actions [such as harming a child out of anger], and, since subjectivism cannot vindicate this strong and widely shared intuition, this is a strong reason to reject subjectivism” (20) This version does not assume any particular moral theory, avoids debates about the content...

... as the one that operates in the actual situation (in which Matthew is not over- whelmed with guilt) or is it a different one? In general, whenever reflection on what one has reason to do triggers fear, panic, anxiety, anger, or com- pulsive desires that interfere to some degree with an agent’s self...

... way through a tangle of puzzles for belief and the non-doxastic attitudes; I will focus on admiration, hope, hatred, and anger. Second, I'll argue that this is independently a natural way of thinking about attitude formation. 1 In sections 1 and 2, I will present those puzzles. In section 3, I...

.... By preemptively acknowledging my own misbehavior at the outset, I anticipate that move and, to some extent, obviate it, or at least drain it of some of its rhetorical force. Even in the absence of widespread endorsement of the anti-hypo-criticism norm, however, being confronted with my anger and pain about your...

..., it is not clear to me that it can be made obedient to anything else. 62. See Cooper, “Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation,” 203: “His anger thus repre- sents a traditional view of things to which his continued self-esteem is tied: he will feel bad about himself unless he acts at once to vindicate his honour...

... s conception of virtue. Whereas some emotions (for example, anger) may involve only affective and conative states, moral emo- tions (for example, resentment) are cognitive states insofar as they involve affective and conative states that are consequential on evaluative appraisal (for example...