Search Results for agree

... not be denied by someone of whom one has no more reason to suspect of error than oneself. For Sidgwick, then, the egoist must not deny the axioms. But it would seem that an egoist would reject benevolence . Second, Sidgwick thinks he must show that the commonsense moralist agrees to the axioms. Benevolence...

... the voters unanimously adopt the same set of preferences. In such situations, all plausible voting rules and all plausible decision rules agree. Cornell University 2010 Arrow, Kenneth. 1951 . Social Choice and Individual Values . New York: Wiley. Bostrom, Nick. 2001 . “The Meta-Newcomb Problem...

...Kieran Oberman This article addresses a previously overlooked problem in the ethics of defensive killing. Everyone agrees that defensive killing can only be justified when it is necessary. But necessary for what? That seemingly simple question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to answer...

... ‘It might be raining, and it's not’ and Moorean sentences like ‘It's raining, and for all I know it's not’. A variety of approaches have been developed to account for those differences. All approaches agree that both Moore sentences and Wittgenstein sentences are classically consistent. In this article I...

.... As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idealized setting). This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that, in this setting, any...

... in the intellect of God. Although other early moderns agreed that modal truths are in some way dependent on God, there were sharp disagreements surrounding two distinct questions: (1) On what in God do modal truths and modal truth-makers depend? (2) What is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths...

... the meaning of homologein (usually translated as “to agree”). She claims that in standard cases, when X asks Y “do you/does she homologei that p?” there is no implication, unlike the English “to agree,” that the speaker (or some salient other person) believes p. Brown then notes the consequences...

.... Intuitively, a dispute between two parties is verbal when the two parties agree on the relevant facts about a domain of concern and just disagree about the language used to describe that domain. In such a case, one has the sense that the two parties are “not really disagreeing...

... he calls nonindexical contextualism —does not cross the “philosophically interesting line” between relativism and absolutism (60). His reason for saying this is that, for any context c , the ordinary contextualist and the nonindexical contextualist will agree on whether |“Chili is tasty”| c...

... with what is unclear” (764–65). I heartily agree with Putnam's view of philosophy expressed here. Still, it can be exhausting for others to keep up. But why did anyone care so much about what Putnam thought at each moment? Randall Auxier's moving preface gives an indication (xxii–xxiii): “It could...

.... 636 BOOK REVEWS Some who do not agree with Lang are confused; others simply fail some- how. Peter Machamer “fails to explain rest as activity,” and a view of mine “fails to understand either the notion of rest or the potency/act relation” (250, n. 57).3...

... consent by issuing a directive that is not an expression of permission. This challenges the prevailing view: most scholars agree that to give consent the consent-giver must understand that they are giving consent. However, Dougherty provides a range of fascinating cases in which the consent-giver could...

..., does not explain any observations. Would Kagan agree with this answer? Given the tight analogy that Kagan sees between the epistemological role of moral intuition in moral epistemology and the epistemological role of empirical observation in science, and given that he expresses sympathy in section...

... is the last of the four on the Politics, when Aristotle scholars agreed to write these volumes, he was fourth in line and so got stuck with Politics V–VI. Surely, one might think, few would choose Politics V–VI over Politics I–II (see Saunders 1995), with its fascinating discussions of the fundamental...

... of the parties among whom it is to obtain so that it is fully international and cross-cul- tural. Intuitively, it would seem that the more things people need to agree on, and the more people needed to agree on them, the harder it will be to come to an agreement. Rawls himself is very restrictive about...

...- vant formulation be in terms of epistemic systems that a community agrees upon? This does not directly affect the antirelativist argument that Boghossian actually gives, but it does directly affect Boghossian’s motive for giving that argument. 3. Against Epistemic Relationalism Recall...

..., Switzerland : Springer . Valles Sean . 2018 . Philosophy of Population Health: Philosophy for a New Public Health Era . New York : Routledge . Even if I have fewer metaphysical intuitions and more Foucauldian cynicism than does Barnes, she and I agree on almost everything. Health...

....” This interpretation of Brentano is admittedly controversial; Kriegel rejects it. I believe nevertheless that it is only against this background that we can understand some of what Brentano says about intentionality . We can begin with some common ground. Kriegel, Textor, and I all agree that in directing our...

... of what broad kind of mental state a normative judgment is. They agree that if normative judgments have the “mind-to-world” direction of fit of beliefs, then in order for the constructivist's proposed truth-conditions to hold, it would have to be the case that the content of the belief that something...

... must) the Kantian insight that we cannot understand things in themselves. Strawson also rebuts the charge that his views about reference and predication commit him to semantic antirealism. The other essays in this cluster are largely expository, and Strawson largely agrees...