Search Results for agent
1-20 of 481 Search Results for
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 413–415.
Published: 01 July 2009
...Stephen Butterfill Lucy O'Brien, Self-Knowing Agents . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xi + 231. Cornell University 2009 BOOK REVIEWS Christopher Shields, Aristotle. London: Routledge, 2007. xvi + 456 pp. This delightful and fully engaging book, written in a sparkling style...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
Published: 01 January 2011
...Mark Schroeder According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions —the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
...Matthew Mandelkern; Ginger Schultheis; David Boylan This essay proposes a new theory of agentive modals : ability modals and their duals, compulsion modals. After criticizing existing approaches—the existential quantificational analysis, the universal quantificational analysis, and the conditional...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2002) 111 (4): 612–615.
Published: 01 October 2002
...Michael McKenna Alfred R. Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. viii, 271. Cornell University 2002 Fischer, John Martin. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994 . Fischer, John Martin, and...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2012) 121 (1): 1–54.
Published: 01 January 2012
...Michael Caie An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2013) 122 (4): 527–575.
Published: 01 October 2013
...Michael Caie Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 1–27.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Thomas Crowther There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout a...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 59–85.
Published: 01 January 2009
...Rachael Briggs Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey...
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2010) 119 (1): 1–30.
Published: 01 January 2010
...Rachael Briggs It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2011) 120 (4): 567–586.
Published: 01 October 2011
... reconciles divine foreknowledge and human freedom and the Ockhamist's way. In particular, this essay further demonstrates that when it comes to divine foreknowledge's compatibility with human freedom, the fundamental question is not the Ockhamist's question of whether God's beliefs about what an agent will...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2013) 122 (2): 189–214.
Published: 01 April 2013
...Carolina Sartorio Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Daniel Koltonski On the shared-ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the friend's valuable ends for the friend's own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn't inoculate them against...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2009) 118 (3): 351–374.
Published: 01 July 2009
... are best solved by comparing the auxiliary to the timocrat, both of whom represent different forms of second-best morality. A lengthy discussion of the early education's effect on the spirited part shows how the auxiliary represents the best kind of moral agent that the second-best nature (silver...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
.... We can thus formalize several distinctions, such as between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories, between universalist and relativist theories, between agent-neutral and agent-relative theories, between monistic and pluralistic theories, between atomistic and holistic theories, and...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2016) 125 (3): 341–396.
Published: 01 July 2016
... view that this essay goes on to develop and defend, called the group epistemic agent account : groups are epistemic agents in their own right, with justified beliefs that respond to both evidence and normative requirements that arise only at the group level but that are nonetheless importantly...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2008) 117 (2): 159–191.
Published: 01 April 2008
... between the agent and others, which conflicts intractably with a presupposition of consequentialism. This allows him to differentiate three potentially conflicting evaluative spheres: morality, prudence, and aesthetics. This essay's account of Mill's utilitarianism coheres with his defense of individual...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2008) 117 (4): 555–606.
Published: 01 October 2008
... Beauty awakens her degree of belief in heads should be one-third. This demonstrates that it can be rational for an agent who gains only self-locating beliefs between two times to alter her degree of belief in a non-self-locating claim. © 2008 by Cornell University 2008 Arntzenius, F. 2003 . “Some...
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2010) 119 (4): 411–447.
Published: 01 October 2010
... conflicts with the principle of Countable Additivity. The essay then argues that the most plausible response to the conflict between these principles is to maintain that they are both valid and that, when an agent cannot satisfy them both, he or she is faced with a rational dilemma. The essay is divided...
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2011) 120 (2): 207–245.
Published: 01 April 2011
...Barry Lam If you are currently a reliable epistemic agent in some domain, you would not want to adopt a rule of belief-revision in that domain that rendered you less reliable. However, you probably would want to adopt a rule that rendered you more reliable in that domain. In the epistemology of...
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2011) 120 (3): 383–421.
Published: 01 July 2011
...; it essentially consists in causal mapping. Unlike the comparative model presupposed in the literature on deliberation, Aristotle's model can account for the virtuous agent's deliberation, as well as deliberation with a view to “satisficing” desires and deliberation that fails to uncover any expedient...