...Louis C. Charland STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By Jon Elster. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. xii, 252. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS The PhilosophiculReviau, Vol. 110, No. 1 (January 2001) STRONG FEELINGS...

... the status of philosophical dogma. Cleavage between value and desire is standardly motivated by appeal to addicts, obsessives, and various 7. Richard Arneson, “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction,” Social Philos- ophy and Policy 16 (1999): 116. 8. See Leviathan, part 1, chap. 11...

... think would make it a better candidate for a “feel good” neurotransmitter, but the issue passes without comment. Cotard's delusion is called an “illusion” (57), though illusions and delusions are not the same thing. Addiction is characterized in a manner that makes it impossible to be a long-term...

... refines them with the aid of a meticulous analysis of recent discussions and a range of vivid examples, and applies them in his closing chapters to such vexed questions as the responsibility of addicts for their addictive behavior, the justification of cross-cultural attributions of blame...

... three primary condi- tions-control, autonomy, and epistemic-he refines them with the aid of a meticulous analysis of recent discussions and a range of vivid examples, and applies them in his closing chapters to such vexed questions as the responsibility of addicts for their addictive behavior...

... Feelings: Emotion, Addiction and Human Behavior, reviewed by Louis C. Charland 108 Robert Shaver, Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History, reviewed by Roger Crisp 111 Gary Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, reviewed by Thomas McCarthy 114 Rae...

... wide range of contemporary philosophical topics—modularity, functionalism, causation, mechanical explanation, the fact–value distinction, for instance—as well as illustrating the implications of his argument for major topics in psychi- atry such as delusion and addiction. Throughout, it seems to me...

.... With astonishing rigor, Fischer and Ravizza argue that if an agent could have done otherwise in just one situation in which the agent recognized that there was reason to do so-for example, if an addict could have re- sisted his desire for a drug in the one situation in which taking it would kill him...

... Quarterly 1 (1984): 3-21. 36 MJLECTION, PLANNING, AGENCY ture-include higher-order desires concerning first-order desires to seek revenge, to issue a cutting remark, to take a drug to which one is addicted, to slap one’s screaming two-year old...

... Publishing. xiii + 129 pp. Hanson, Craig, with a chapter by George Ainslie. 2009. Thinking about Addiction: Hyperbolic Discounting and Responsible Agency. Value Inquiry: Social Philosophy. Amsterdam: Rodopi. xvii + 129 pp. Hattab, Helen. 2009. Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge...

..., and George Graham, eds. 2011. Addiction and Responsibility. Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. xii þ306 pp. Price, Huw. 2010. Naturalism without Mirrors. New York: Oxford University Press. xii þ336 pp. Pritchard, Duncan. 2009. Knowledge. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. xii þ...

... something that he did not plan to do before. The description of the heroin addict who compulsively takes the drug, which Searle presents early in his book, suggests an alternative way in which he could deal with akrasia. Searle regards the case of the heroin addict as an unusual one in which...

... reflective nature as a weakness, imposing a need for identification rather like an addict’s need for her drug or a dia- betic’s need for insulin? He can make the best of a bad situation by at least selecting an identity he likes, as the caffeine addict chooses a tasty coffee drink rather than...

... the social practice” of, say, wage labor (by identifying it as a social malady and calling for its abolition), do I thereby denigrate the wage laborers who make up the majority of those who participate in the practice? Is a condemnation of heroin use necessarily an insult to addicts? 3...

... to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schelling, T. 1960 . The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Watson, G. 1999 . Disordered Appetites. In Addiction: Entries and Exits, ed. J. Elster, 3 -28. New York: Russell Sage Foundation...

....”38As we put the problem before, the fact that an action will achieve something one desires, even unavoidably, is not necessarily a normative reason for acting-it has no inherent bearing on the question of what an agent should do. A drug addict may have a desire for heroin that is as good...

... Geraldine , and Gordon Norman B. 1978 . “ Rehabilitation Experiences of Women Ex-Addicts in Methadone Treatment .” International Journal of the Addictions 13 , no. 4 : 639 – 55 . doi.org/10.3109/10826087809039291 . Baker Carl Leroy 1968 . “ Indirect Questions in English...

... of other aesthetic experiences through the manipulation of agency—including senses of constriction, of drama, of tragedy, and, in the cases of some addictive games, an experience of the dissolution of the self ( Schüll 2012: 189–209 ). My claim is that agency is the medium , and not necessarily...

... infallibly performable. Terry Connolly recently raised the question (again in conversation) whether an addicted smoker can literally decide to stop smoking (as opposed to just giving lip service to the decision). A more decisive objection to this proposal is that deciding-to-A can have conse- quences...

... justification far too easy to come by. Consider the following: ignoring evidence : Philip Morris is one of the largest tobacco companies in the world, and each of its operative members is individually aware of the massive amounts of scientific evidence revealing not only the addictiveness of smoking but also...