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The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 209–239.
Published: 01 April 2012
... acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that generate the voluntary activities making...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (2): 201–242.
Published: 01 April 2010
..., which it argues is largely independent of any particular ethical standpoint, gives us some reason to doubt a class of ethical theories that includes utilitarianism. © 2010 by Cornell University 2010 Acting for the Right Reasons Julia Markovits...
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 126–130.
Published: 01 January 2008
...John Collins Herman Cappelen and Ernst Lepore, Insensitive Semantics: A Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism . Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. xii + 219 pp. Cornell University 2007 BOOK REVIEWS Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough...
The Philosophical Review (2010) 119 (1): 77–95.
Published: 01 January 2010
...John Turri In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place...
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 130–132.
Published: 01 January 2004
...Margaret Gilbert Keith Graham, Practical Reasoning in a Social World: How We Act Together. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xi, 202. Cornell University 2004 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 113, No. 1 (January 2004...
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 548–550.
Published: 01 October 2005
...Jesus H. Aguilar Berent Enç, How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. vi, 252. Cornell University 2005 BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4 (October 2005) Berent Enç, How We Act...
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (1): 152–155.
Published: 01 January 2002
...Mandy Simons ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS AND SENTENCE MEANING. By William P. Alston. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii, 327 Cornell University 2002 BOOK REVIEWS Solomon Feferman et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 203...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 319–322.
Published: 01 April 2021
...Samia Hesni New Work on Speech Acts impresses both in scope and content. The ‘new work’ not only bridges speech act theory (SAT) with other methodologies in philosophy of language (and does so masterfully) but also gives us a new and more systematic articulation of what SAT could be. The...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Stephen Darwall Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the...
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (3): 301–343.
Published: 01 July 2017
... analysis—it presents a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On this account, the act conditional analysis , a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available action (in a sense the essay makes precise) that is such that if...
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 97–143.
Published: 01 January 2021
...Peter van Elswyk A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This article is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
...Caspar Hare Some moral theories (for example, standard, “ex post” forms of egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and constraint-based deontology) tell you, in some situations in which you are interacting with a group of people, to avoid acting in the way that is expectedly best for everybody. This essay...
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (3): 383–421.
Published: 01 July 2011
...Karen Margrethe Nielsen This article examines Aristotle's model of deliberation as inquiry (zêtêsis), arguing that Aristotle does not treat the presumption of open alternatives as a precondition for rational deliberation. Deliberation aims to uncover acts that are up to us and conducive to our ends...
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 189–214.
Published: 01 April 2013
... determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed to perform. This essay argues...
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (4): 611–618.
Published: 01 October 2012
...Joshua Gert Julia Markovits has recently argued for what she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’: the thesis that one’s action is morally worthy if and only if one’s motivating reasons for acting mirror, in content and strength, the reasons that explain why the action ought, morally, to be...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
...) and (ii) are inconsistent with the popular belief that, other things being equal, when people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they ought to be punished for this—even if they have repented, are now virtuous, and punishing them would benefit no one. Insofar as we cannot deny (i), we are either...
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 1–58.
Published: 01 January 2015
... such is first generated by the understanding through an act of synthesis of the imagination. Against this reading, this article argues that a key characteristic of space as a form of intuition is its nonconceptual unity, which defines the properties of space and is as such necessarily independent of...
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
...Kieran Setiya This essay is about love and its place in ethics. It argues that there is no one it is irrational to love, that it is rational to act with partiality to those we love, and that the rationality of doing so is not conditional on love. It follows that Anscombe and Taurek are right: you...
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 473–507.
Published: 01 October 2016
... when the judgment is in fact mistaken). In these instances, your friendship can make it the case that you may not act on your own practical and even moral judgments because, at those times, you have a duty as their close friend to defer to their judgments. As a result, treating your friend properly as...
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (4): 465–500.
Published: 01 October 2009
... explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act. Cornell University 2009 The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended Neil Sinhababu...