1-20 of 43 Search Results for


Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account

Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
Close Modal
Sort by
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 338–343.
Published: 01 April 2023
...Angela Mendelovici; David Bourget Tye Michael , Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2021 . 133 pp. © 2023 by Cornell University 2023 Michael Tye is perhaps best known for his defense of tracking representationalism , a view...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (4): 523–528.
Published: 01 October 2022
... recommend it to philosophers of mind and perception. Papineau’s central argument is a last view standing argument : wading through the detritus left after his assault on competitor views—naive realism and representationalism—one finds the qualitative view, standing strong. It is “the only option...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 511–518.
Published: 01 July 2013
...-representationalism, and I believe it has devastating consequences for dualism. I defend it in a recent book ( Hill 2009 ) that complements Pereboom's discussion. References Block N. 1978 . “ Troubles with Functionalism .” In Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology , ed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 285–324.
Published: 01 July 2009
.... For most of the twentieth century, discussion of minimum condi- tions for empirical representation of physical subject matters had a defi- nite directional bias. This bias is what I call Individual Representationalism. According to this view, an individual cannot objectively and empirically represent...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 176–180.
Published: 01 January 2021
... through experience. The book closes, in section 11.7, with an argument that the semantic approach undermines representationalism. In chapter 5, Breckenridge considers the linguistic implementation of this function, 2 and in chapter 6, he incorporates implicit domain restriction into the account...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (2): 179–217.
Published: 01 April 2019
... for representationalism, they would need to be spelled out in such a way that the representations fix the explanation of the RDC's so based; and in order for them to meet the challenges that arose for dispositionalism, they would need to spelled out in such a way that the dispositions cannot be justifiably misidentified...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (4): 481–531.
Published: 01 October 2021
... (1999, 2003, 2007, 2019) has argued that the variability of color experiences undermines representationalism, and Jonathan Cohen (2004, 2009, 2007) has argued that it provides strong reasons for color-relationalism. Yet, there are interesting dissimilarities between color-experience variability...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 31–75.
Published: 01 January 2001
..., in ‘Three Dualist Theories of the Passions,” Philosophical Topics 19 (1991): 153-200. Fear, he argues, represents the badness of its inten- tional object. Margaret Wilson defends a similar position in “Descartes on the Representationality of Sensation,” in Central Themes in Ear4 MohPhilosophy, ed...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 156–158.
Published: 01 January 2015
... Press . Price Huw 2004 . “ Naturalism without Representationalism .” In Naturalism in Question , ed. De Caro Mario and Macarthur David , 71 – 88 . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Other philosophers, such as John McDowell, Akeel Bilgrami, David Macarthur...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 264–268.
Published: 01 April 2018
... takes to be a better theory of the nature of the mind and its place in the world, namely, representationalism. The first two essays of part II (“In Defense of Type-Materialism” and “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem”) are classic works in the philosophy of mind and I...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (3): 467–471.
Published: 01 July 2021
... seems to be portraying ‘the Buddhist’ as holding a representationalist view of perception, and Buddhist representationalism as imposing a veil of ideas between perceiving subject and external world. Most Buddhist schools are direct realist, and the second claim is at least questionable. There is also...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (1): 117–121.
Published: 01 January 2018
... “propositionalism” to denote representationalism, or intentionalism (though note that not all those who hold these views agree that the contents of perception are propositional). He assays each option, ruling out all but an adverbial theory on which perceptual experience is a nonrelational monadic state...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (4): 558–561.
Published: 01 October 2018
... to any theory, it is accommodated by all the major theories (sense datum theory, visual-field theory, naive realism, and representationalism), which testifies to its truth. On all these views, colors either are or are perceptually represented to be qualities that fill spatial regions and stand in spatial...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 594–597.
Published: 01 October 2002
...). The case for the gap uses the undisputed premise from the con- ceivability argument, that zombies are conceivable (more on this in a moment). Chapter 4 argues that various attempts to bridge the gap (including higher-order thought theories and representationalism) don’t work. Chapter 5 rejects a number...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 136–139.
Published: 01 January 2004
... monads only objectively or representationally, and not formally. Representation is a feature of perceptions that arises not from causal influx, but from pre-estab- lished harmony. It is, therefore, intrinsic in a strong sense. This means that it constitutes an appropriate basis for supervenient...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 333–338.
Published: 01 April 2023
..., on the other hand, such as Bendaña and Mandelbaum (chap. 3) or Murez (chap. 7) hold that a fragment is a psychologically real entity. This means that in principle we can ask whether fragments are internally coherent without triviality. This distinction between representationalism and dispositionalism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 499–503.
Published: 01 July 2023
... representationally accurate in the way one might suppose necessary to be a realist about that component (another way in which naive correspondence treatments of truth sneak into philosophy of science by way of assuming that bits of models should map one-to-one to bits of the world and that realism about a model...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 263–298.
Published: 01 May 2021
... to be representationally adequate. Nevertheless, the principal aim of this article is to build on existing research on modeling mental qualities. Whether or not the regional framework has been implicitly assumed, it has certainly not been explicitly developed, and its implications for the structure of experience have...
FIGURES | View All (7)
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2015) 124 (1): 163–167.
Published: 01 January 2015
... that, in fact , all conscious representations are intermediate level, he doesn't explain why consciousness is constrained in this way. One thing that makes this especially puzzling is that he rejects representationalism, holding that qualitative character is determined by intrinsic features...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 139–168.
Published: 01 April 2006
... the structure of our minds. So, a version of the “mysterian” view of consciousness (McGinn 1989) remains open. Another possibility—and the one I myself accept—is that some version of representationalism is true for phenomenal consciousness. According to representationalists (Dretske 1995; Tye 1995...