...David James Barnett Is self-knowledge a requirement of rationality, like consistency, or means-ends coherence? Many claim so, citing the evident impropriety of asserting, and the alleged irrationality of believing, Moore-paradoxical propositions of the form < p , but I don't believe that p...

..., parentheticalism opens the door to altogether eliminating the act-type of assertion from linguistic theorizing. © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 knowledge representation assertion, Moore's paradox parenthetical verbs use-conditional meaning References Adler, Jonathan. 2002. Belief's Own Ethics...

... resemblance to Moore’s paradox, in which an agent believes a proposition A while simultaneously believing that he or she does not believe A.9 Just like a self-doubting agent, an agent with Moore’s paradoxical beliefs is guaranteed to be wrong about something, even though his or her beliefs are perfectly...

... a novel account of Moore's Paradox that is designed to show how the requirements of rationality explain the aim of belief (chapters 9 and 10). I wasn't able to make full sense of the latter argument, but the former, I think, targeted a “straw man,” on which the truth of (T) explains the truth of (J...

... the way self-knowledge can be inferential is plausible and well argued. But his application of this to what he calls “trivial” self-knowledge, for example, my knowledge that I believe I am wearing socks, seems to me questionable. As is apparent from “Moore's Paradox,” there is an incoherence involved...

... into the picture” (32–33). Chapter 3 does the main work in making good on this claim: beginning with an analysis of Moore’s paradox, Moran contrasts the theoretical stance with that of deliberation and commitment, and explains the notion of avowal, as distinct from self-attribution, in terms of the latter...

... the specifically first-person character of the phenomenon. … A more complete characterization of the first-person perspective will require bringing the agent more explicitly into the picture” (32–33). Chapter 3 does the main work in making good on this claim: beginning with an analysis of Moore’s paradox...

... perspective will require bringing the agent more explicitly into the picture” (32–33). Chapter 3 does the main work in making good on this claim: beginning with an analysis of Moore’s paradox, Moran contrasts the theoretical stance with that of deliberation and commitment, and explains the notion...

... perspective will require bringing the agent more explicitly into the picture” (32–33). Chapter 3 does the main work in making good on this claim: beginning with an analysis of Moore’s paradox, Moran contrasts the theoretical stance with that of deliberation and commitment, and explains the notion...

... Philosophy. London: Continuum. vi + 186 pp. Green, Mitchell, and John N. Williams, eds. 2007. Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford: Clarendon. xi + 247 pp. Groebner, Valentin. 2007. Who Are You? Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early...

.... 1993 . Betting on Theories . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Makinson, David. 1965 . “The Paradox of the Preface.” Analysis 25 : 205 -7. Moore, George E. 1962a . Commonplace Book: 1919-1953 . London: Allen and Unwin. ____. 1962b . “Certainty.” In Philosophical Papers , 226...

... be tempting to align a commitment to objectivity in ethics with a commitment to intrinsic value. G. E. Moore thought that a hankering after objectivity was really a hankering after intrinsic value, and he envis- aged an entailment in one direction at any rate: “from the proposition that a particular...

... point out what to my thinking is one of the most important recommenda- tions of the account: that it provides a nice handling of the knowledge version of Moore’s paradox and other troubling conjunctions. Famously, Moore noted the oddity of assertions of the form “P, but I...

.... 2001 . “ A New Solution to Moore’s Paradox .” Philosophical Studies 105 ( 3 ): 237 – 50 . doi:10.1023/A:1010361708803 . ———. 2004 . “ Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics .” Noûs 38 ( 4 ): 585 – 616 . doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00485.x . ———. 2006 . “ What Might...

... methodological notions of logical consequence, logical truth, necessary truth and apriori truth [must be appreciated] and separated from one another. (1:xi) Doctrine (1) he associates primarily with G. E. Moore and (2) with Saul Kripke. A third thesis (which I will label [3]) seems equally...

... methodological notions of logical consequence, logical truth, necessary truth and apriori truth [must be appreciated] and separated from one another. (1:xi) Doctrine (1) he associates primarily with G. E. Moore and (2) with Saul Kripke. A third thesis (which I will label [3]) seems equally...

... notions of logical consequence, logical truth, necessary truth and apriori truth [must be appreciated] and separated from one another. (1:xi) Doctrine (1) he associates primarily with G. E. Moore and (2) with Saul Kripke. A third thesis (which I will label [3]) seems equally central...

... consequence, logical truth, necessary truth and apriori truth [must be appreciated] and separated from one another. (1:xi) Doctrine (1) he associates primarily with G. E. Moore and (2) with Saul Kripke. A third thesis (which I will label [3]) seems equally central to his assessments, a tenet...

... associates primarily with G. E. Moore and (2) with Saul Kripke. A third thesis (which I will label [3]) seems equally central to his assessments, a tenet that might be dubbed nontransparent propositionalism: sentences carry fairly traditional propositions as their referents, but the contents...

..., logical truth, necessary truth and apriori truth [must be appreciated] and separated from one another. (1:xi) Doctrine (1) he associates primarily with G. E. Moore and (2) with Saul Kripke. A third thesis (which I will label [3]) seems equally central to his assessments, a tenet that might...