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Cognition
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 1–47.
Published: 01 January 2008
... give voice to our most cognitively primitive generalizations and that this hypothesis accounts for a variety of facts ranging from acquisition patterns to cross-linguistic data concerning the phonological articulation of operators. I go on to develop an account of the nature of these cognitively...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 251–298.
Published: 01 April 2020
...Zoe Jenkin According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (3): 323–393.
Published: 01 July 2020
...E. J. Green A venerable view holds that a border between perception and cognition is built into our cognitive architecture and that this imposes limits on the way information can flow between them. While the deliverances of perception are freely available for use in reasoning and inference...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2016) 125 (4): 509–587.
Published: 01 October 2016
... knowledge.” Whatever else it takes for an agent's credences to amount to knowledge, their success, or accuracy, must be the product of cognitive ability or skill . The brand of Bayesianism developed here helps ensure this ability condition is satisfied. Cognitive ability, in turn, helps make credences...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (1): 180–185.
Published: 01 January 2021
...Michael Rescorla Shea Nicholas , Representation in Cognitive Science . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2018 . xi + 292 pp . © 2021 by Cornell University 2021 Nicholas Shea's writings are required reading for philosophers of mind, especially those interested in the mind...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 304–308.
Published: 01 April 2012
...Robert D. Rupert Clark Andy , Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension . New York : Oxford University Press , 2008 . xxix +286 pp . © 2012 by Cornell University 2012 References Noë Alva . 2004 . Action in Perception . Cambridge, MA...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 627–632.
Published: 01 October 2000
...Kent Bach Cornell University 2000 CONCEPTS: WHERE COGNITIVE SCIENCE WENT WRONG. By Jerry A. Fodor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 174. BOOK REVIEWS
dez’s project, where having a concept is linked to having linguistic abilities.
So...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 621–623.
Published: 01 October 2001
...Alan Millar THE BODY IN MIND: UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE PROCESSES. By Mark Rowlands. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, Pp. x, 270. Cornell University 2001 BOOK REVIEWS
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (October 2001)
THE BODY...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (4): 423–427.
Published: 01 October 2024
...Matthew McGrath [email protected] Pinillos Ángel , Why We Doubt: A Cognitive Account of Our Skeptical Inclinations . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2023 . viii + 277 pp. © 2024 by Cornell University 2024 In Why We Doubt: A Cognitive Account of Our Skeptical...
Image
Published: 01 July 2023
Figure 6. Agents faced with cognitive search choices, choosing via expected accuracy. Red agents are better at finding flaws in q -opposing studies; blue agents vice versa. Thin lines are individuals; thick lines are averages.
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 266–269.
Published: 01 April 2009
... to the point at which
we uncover the true idea of God. On any interpretation, though, eliciting the
true idea of God is crucial for Spinoza because the highest kind of cognition
(identified in the Ethics as scientia intuitiva) proceeds in the real causal order
of its objects, always deducing effects from...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2019) 128 (4): 463–509.
Published: 01 October 2019
...Jack C. Lyons The paper offers a solution to the generality problem for a reliabilist epistemology, by developing an “algorithm and parameters” scheme for type-individuating cognitive processes. Algorithms are detailed procedures for mapping inputs to outputs. Parameters are psychological variables...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (3): 355–458.
Published: 01 July 2023
...Figure 6. Agents faced with cognitive search choices, choosing via expected accuracy. Red agents are better at finding flaws in q -opposing studies; blue agents vice versa. Thin lines are individuals; thick lines are averages. ...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (2): 147–190.
Published: 01 April 2017
...Daniel Sutherland Despite the importance of Kant's claims about mathematical cognition for his philosophy as a whole and for subsequent philosophy of mathematics, there is still no consensus on his philosophy of arithmetic, and in particular the role he assigns intuition in it. This inquiry sets...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2022) 131 (2): 129–168.
Published: 01 April 2022
...Anil Gomes; A. W. Moore; Andrew Stephenson For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two subfaculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms that are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2023) 132 (2): 239–292.
Published: 01 April 2023
... in cognition. I argue that we have no compelling reason to believe that encapsulation explains (or even contributes to an explanation of) perceptual tractability, and much reason to doubt it. This is because there exist much deeper computational challenges for perception than information access...
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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (4): 495–519.
Published: 01 October 2001
... of visuomotor action, on the other. This “dual visual systems” hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for an alternative...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2021) 130 (2): 311–315.
Published: 01 April 2021
..., will illuminate the book's central claims. Although Merritt's account of virtue as good cognitive character is compelling, it is also ambiguous in an instructive way, pointing to unresolved questions of a more fundamental kind. On the one hand, Merritt argues that what makes the good use of our cognitive...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 235–266.
Published: 01 April 2000
... for understanding Kant’s critical philosophy. For, as
Kant himself claimed, all the distinctive claims of this philosophy
rest on, and develop out of, a detailed account of the way all our1
cognition of things requires both intuitions and concepts.’
Unfortunately, interpreting Kant’s distinction between...
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