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Awareness growth

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2024) 133 (1): 1–32.
Published: 01 January 2024
...Chloé de Canson Awareness growth—coming to entertain propositions of which one was previously unaware—is a crucial aspect of epistemic thriving. And yet, it is widely believed that orthodox Bayesianism cannot accommodate this phenomenon since that would require employing supposedly defective...
FIGURES
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 141–144.
Published: 01 January 2000
... of the book, then, consists mainly in meeting, either by rebuttal or by accommodation, claims about the contribution of aware- ness of large-scale form to musical understanding that might plausibly be made by an architectonicist. These claims are that “conscious awareness of or reflection on large...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 533–541.
Published: 01 October 2014
... that they view as moral, for example, an interest in keeping moral duties distinct so that their discharge does not result in sectarian and political conflict, as external to Irwin's tradition, one must highlight Irwin's restricted aims and be aware that there are rather different ways of telling the story...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 307–310.
Published: 01 April 2013
...” is mistaken. In saying “I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception,” Hume is not denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 314–317.
Published: 01 April 2013
...” is mistaken. In saying “I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception,” Hume is not denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 318–322.
Published: 01 April 2013
...” is mistaken. In saying “I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception,” Hume is not denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 322–325.
Published: 01 April 2013
...” is mistaken. In saying “I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception,” Hume is not denying that he finds a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 325–327.
Published: 01 April 2013
... a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct from the experience as a whole, but there is a sense in which the subject is an “explicit object” (87) of his attention. What he does not find is a subject having a temporally extended existence—or at any rate, one that is presented to him...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (2): 310–314.
Published: 01 April 2013
... a subject, for the perception is an experi- encing and constitutively involves a subject. He is not aware of the subject as something distinct from the experience as a whole, but there is a sense in which the subject is an “explicit object” (87) of his attention. What he does not find is a subject having...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 375–377.
Published: 01 July 2009
... powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which may provide the premises...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 378–381.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 381–384.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 384–389.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 390–392.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 393–402.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 402–406.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 406–409.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 409–413.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (3): 413–415.
Published: 01 July 2009
... is ultimately not sufficiently powerful, Shields turns to an alternative argument from the growth of organisms, which he introduces as “Aristotle’s metaphysical defense of teleological causation”(87). Yet, in describing and analyzing it, the only text he refers to is the discussion of growth in GC 1.5, which...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (1): 31–75.
Published: 01 January 2001
... is nothing other than a being that is aware of [s’aper~oitde] everything that happens in it” (Traiti 55/57) and that “thought consists in that consciousness [conscience], that testimony [ tesmoignage] and that inner sentiment [sentiment intm’eur] by which the mind is directed to [ est udverty...