1-12 of 12 Search Results for

Agony Argument

Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account

Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
Close Modal
Sort by
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (1): 95–130.
Published: 01 January 2020
... present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument , and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a problem: because which desires one will have in...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
... we have reason to avoid future agony independently of any subjectivist fact) (1:73–82) and arguments that more sophisticated “procedurally rationalist” forms of Subjectivism, such as those defined above, are actually incoherent (1:83–101). However, it can be argued that Metaethical Subjectivism...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 399–410.
Published: 01 July 2005
... entitled to this argument. His emphasis on the contingency of our actual pref- erences suggests that he should allow that an individual may have different preferences in different situations (some for persistence and some for mere continuance). Perhaps, however, Martin’s argument is meant simply as an...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 127–130.
Published: 01 January 2009
... means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping intel- ligibles, both Plato and Aristotle deny belief to nonrational motivations, grant- ing them instead the cognitive resources of imagination (termed phantasia in Aristotle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 131–134.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., Lorenz (here- after ‘L’) answers, to the first question, that for Plato and Aristotle rational motivation uniquely involves means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping intel- ligibles, both Plato and Aristotle deny belief to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 134–138.
Published: 01 January 2009
... means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping intel- ligibles, both Plato and Aristotle deny belief to nonrational motivations, grant- ing them instead the cognitive resources of imagination (termed phantasia in Aristotle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 138–144.
Published: 01 January 2009
... means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping intel- ligibles, both Plato and Aristotle deny belief to nonrational motivations, grant- ing them instead the cognitive resources of imagination (termed phantasia in Aristotle...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 103–107.
Published: 01 January 2009
... action? In response, Lorenz (here- after ‘L’) answers, to the first question, that for Plato and Aristotle rational motivation uniquely involves means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping intel- ligibles, both Plato and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 108–112.
Published: 01 January 2009
... motivations employ in the generation of action? In response, Lorenz (here- after ‘L’) answers, to the first question, that for Plato and Aristotle rational motivation uniquely involves means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 112–115.
Published: 01 January 2009
..., Lorenz (here- after ‘L’) answers, to the first question, that for Plato and Aristotle rational motivation uniquely involves means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping intel- ligibles, both Plato and Aristotle deny belief to...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 115–121.
Published: 01 January 2009
... motivations employ in the generation of action? In response, Lorenz (here- after ‘L’) answers, to the first question, that for Plato and Aristotle rational motivation uniquely involves means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (1): 121–127.
Published: 01 January 2009
...- after ‘L’) answers, to the first question, that for Plato and Aristotle rational motivation uniquely involves means-ends reasoning, and, to the second, that beginning with Plato’s Theaetetus argument that belief involves grasping intel- ligibles, both Plato and Aristotle deny belief to nonrational...