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Derek Parfit On What Matters

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Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 79–105.
Published: 01 January 2014
...Stephen Darwall Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2017) 126 (4): 421–479.
Published: 01 October 2017
... label of “extensional equivalence” (for example, Portmore 2011 , Dreier 2011 , and earlier, Lyons 1965 ). 5 A striking suggestion of extensional equivalence can be found in Derek Parfit's (2011) book On What Matters . Parfit argues that his favorite versions of consequentialism, Kantianism, and...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
Published: 01 October 2014
... mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues that...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2009) 118 (1): 87–102.
Published: 01 January 2009
... identical with the person whose experience of the past event caused it. Remembering in the ordinary way is supposed to be a special case of quasi-remembering, one in which the identity con- dition is satisfied. Derek Parfit and I made use of the notion ofquasi- memory in answering the objection...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2006) 115 (2): 169–198.
Published: 01 April 2006
... . ____. n.d. “Normativity, Necessity, and the Synthetic a priori: A Response to Derek Parfit.” Unpublished manuscript, www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/Korsgaard.on.Parfit.pdf . Lavin, Douglas. 2004 . “Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error.” Ethics 114 : 424 -57. Lewis, David. 1996...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Published: 01 July 2013
...Selim Berker When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 243–246.
Published: 01 April 2010
... chapters of The Nature and Structure of Content, King’s goal is to provide an account of what “imposes structure on and binds together the con- stituents of propositions” (24). The problem is long familiar and long ignored; it has sometimes been called “the problem of the unity of the proposition.” To...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2013) 122 (1): 93–117.
Published: 01 January 2013
... Press . Nuyen A. T. 1998 . “ Just Modesty .” American Philosophical Quarterly 35 ( 1 ): 101 – 9 . Parfit Derek . 1987 . Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Clarendon Press . Raterman Ty . 2006 . “ On Modesty: Being Good and Knowing It without Flaunting It .” American...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2012) 121 (3): 407–442.
Published: 01 July 2012
... in- stance, Derek Parfit suggests that desiderative views should declare that only desires “about my own life” are examples of self-interested, or pru- dential, desires.27 But Parfit himself is less than clear about what this is supposed to mean. Which desires are about my own life? One proposal...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2019) 128 (4): 423–462.
Published: 01 October 2019
... similar point, when he says that it can be a “relief to retreat into an artificial, rule-governed world in which, on the one hand, it is very clear what matters and, on the other hand, it is also very clear that what matters in the game doesn't really matter.” Note that Scheffler only discusses the relief...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2016) 125 (4): 451–472.
Published: 01 October 2016
... argues that such theories are mistaken. Go ahead and do what is expectedly best for everybody. The argument is based on the thought that when interacting with an individual it is fine for you to act in the expected interests of the individual and that many interactions with individuals may compose an...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 October 2009) 118 (4): 425–464.
Published: 01 October 2009
.... 2006 . “Selfless Desires.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 : 665 -79. Olson, Eric T. 1997 . The Human Animal . New York: Oxford University Press. ____. 2007 . What Are We? New York: Oxford University Press. Parfit, Derek. 1984 . Reasons and Persons . Oxford: Clarendon...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2014) 123 (2): 173–204.
Published: 01 April 2014
... moral theory that has ever been written,” Parfit (2011, 1:xxxiii, xl) “the best book on ethics ever written,” “the book it would be best for everyone interested in ethics to read, remember, and be able to assume that others have read.” The lack of attention may be, in part, because Sidgwick himself...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2014) 123 (3): 251–280.
Published: 01 July 2014
... circumstance, is by doing something morally wrong. Our topic is not Williams on moral permissibility but a more radical claim that others have made. In a letter quoted by Liam Murphy, Derek Parfit wrote: “It's odd that Williams gives, as the thought that the person's wife might hope he was having, that he...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 January 2014) 123 (1): 43–77.
Published: 01 January 2014
... before exploring this response, it is important to observe—as Parfit famously did—that identity does not matter for rational prudential concern. I should be just as prudentially concerned about what happens to Lefty as I should be prudentially concerned about what happens to my future self, whether or...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 July 2010) 119 (3): 273–313.
Published: 01 July 2010
... sortal covers, we can strip away these sortal covers and think of the same objects as mere quan- tities of matter. That is, we can think of an object in a way that places no emphasis on any properties that define what it is to belong to a particular kind, for any kind. Conceiving of an object in a...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 250–255.
Published: 01 April 2010
... chapters of The Nature and Structure of Content, King’s goal is to provide an account of what “imposes structure on and binds together the con- stituents of propositions” (24). The problem is long familiar and long ignored; it has sometimes been called “the problem of the unity of the proposition.” To...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 256–258.
Published: 01 April 2010
... chapters of The Nature and Structure of Content, King’s goal is to provide an account of what “imposes structure on and binds together the con- stituents of propositions” (24). The problem is long familiar and long ignored; it has sometimes been called “the problem of the unity of the proposition.” To...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 246–250.
Published: 01 April 2010
... is difficult to understand what it might mean to say that a state of affairs is somehow true or false, let alone espe- cially or paradigmatically true. Consider the state of affairs of Socrates-being-seated- on-a-leather-sofa. To many today it will seem a kind of category mistake to call this...
Journal Article
The Philosophical Review (1 April 2010) 119 (2): 259–263.
Published: 01 April 2010
... chapters of The Nature and Structure of Content, King’s goal is to provide an account of what “imposes structure on and binds together the con- stituents of propositions” (24). The problem is long familiar and long ignored; it has sometimes been called “the problem of the unity of the proposition.” To...