Skip to Main Content
Duke University Press Logo Open Menu
header search
Search
Advanced Search
Skip Nav Destination

Ought, Agents, and Actions

The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 1–41.
This article has been cited by the following articles in journals that are participating in CrossRef Cited-by Linking.
Verbal Disagreement and Semantic Plans
  • Alexander W. Kocurek
Erkenntnis (2025) 90 (3): 1061.
The fundamental divisions in ethics
  • Matthew Hammerton
Inquiry (2025) 68 (2): 318.
What are we to do? Making sense of ‘joint ought’ talk
  • Rowan Mellor
  • Margaret Shea
Philosophical Studies (2025) 182 (3-4): 705.
Practical Deliberation is Normative
  • JESSE HAMBLY
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2025) 11 (2): 338.
Contextualism and the truth norm
  • Darren Bradley
Episteme 1.
Pointless epistemic norms
  • Wooram Lee
Synthese (2025) 205 (2)
Expressivism and moral independence
  • Elliot Salinger
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2024) 108 (1): 136.
Legal proof: why knowledge matters and knowing does not
  • Andy Mueller
Asian Journal of Philosophy (2024) 3 (1)
Interpreting Action with Norms: Responsibility and the Twofold Nature of the Ought‐Implies‐Can Principle
  • Sebastián Figueroa Rubio
Ratio Juris (2024) 37 (4): 293.
What is conceptual hypocrisy? Is it problematic?
  • Xindi Ye
Topoi (2024) 43 (5): 1685.
Desire, moral evaluation or sense of duty: The modal framing of stated preference elicitation
  • Eva Wanek
  • Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde
  • Alda Mari
Environmental Values (2024) 33 (4): 434.
Ought-Implies-Can in Context
  • Darren Bradley
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (2024) 11 (0)
On the agent-relativity of ‘ought’
  • Junhyo Lee
Analysis (2024) 84 (3): 483.
The Necessity of ‘Need’
  • Ashley Shaw
Ethics (2023) 133 (3): 329.
Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation1
  • Kyle Blumberg
  • John Hawthorne
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2023) 106 (1): 84.
On an Alleged Refutation of Ethical Egoism
  • John J. Tilley
The Journal of Value Inquiry (2023) 57 (3): 533.
Not Normative Enough: A Dilemma for Zhu Xi’s Moral Realism?
  • Aldrin Relador
Australasian Philosophical Review (2023) 7 (2): 188.
The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation
  • John Pittard
Philosophical Studies (2023) 180 (9): 2617.
Evidential Probabilities and Credences
  • Anna-Maria Asunta Eder
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2023) 74 (1): 1.
Thinking and being sure*
  • Jeremy Goodman
  • Ben Holguín
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2023) 106 (3): 634.
The Onus in ‘Ought’
  • Mahrad Almotahari
  • Brian Rabern
Analysis (2023) 83 (1): 13.
X—Ethics and the First-Person Perspective
  • Matthew Boyle
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2023) 123 (3): 253.
From Ideal Worlds to Ideality
  • CRAIG WARMKE
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2023) 9 (1): 114.
Agent-focused Moral Realism Defended: Responses to my Critics
  • Yong Huang
Australasian Philosophical Review (2023) 7 (2): 195.
Devoting ourselves to the manifestly unattainable*
  • Nicholas Southwood
  • David Wiens
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2022) 104 (3): 696.
Ought and agency
  • Daniel Skibra
Synthese (2022) 200 (5)
Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View
  • Nathan Robert Howard
Ethics (2022) 132 (4): 787.
Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency
  • Garrett Cullity
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2021)
Explicating the concept of epistemic rationality
  • Anna-Maria A. Eder
Synthese (2021) 199 (1-2): 4975.
Ought-contextualism and reasoning
  • Darren Bradley
Synthese (2021) 199 (1-2): 2977.
Compositional Semantics and Normative ‘Ought’
  • Joanna Klimczyk
Axiomathes (2021) 31 (3): 381.
The possibility of wildly unrealistic justice and the principle/proposal distinction
  • Nicholas Southwood
Philosophical Studies (2021) 178 (7): 2403.
Sellars, we-intentions and ought-statements
  • Stefanie Dach
Synthese (2021) 198 (5): 4415.
The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning
  • Andy Mueller
Synthese (2021) 199 (1-2): 5395.
A puzzle about enkratic reasoning
  • Jonathan Way
Philosophical Studies (2021) 178 (10): 3177.
Husserl on Eidetic Norms
  • Emanuela Carta
Husserl Studies (2021) 37 (2): 127.
“Ought” and intensionality
  • Junhyo Lee
Synthese (2021) 199 (1-2): 4621.
Two puzzles about ability can
  • Malte Willer
Linguistics and Philosophy (2021) 44 (3): 551.
The Game of Belief
  • Barry Maguire
  • Jack Woods
The Philosophical Review (2020) 129 (2): 211.
A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools
  • Caleb Perl
Mind (2020) 129 (513): 129.
Ascribing practical knowledge
  • Marija Jankovic
Linguistics and Philosophy (2020) 43 (3): 247.
Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship
  • Lindsay Crawford
Synthese (2019) 196 (4): 1575.
Reasons and practical possibility
  • Simon Robertson
Inquiry (2019) 62 (9-10): 1104.
Distinguishing Agent-Relativity from Agent-Neutrality
  • Matthew Hammerton
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2019) 97 (2): 239.
Contractualism for Us As We Are
  • Nicholas Southwood
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) 99 (3): 529.
Consequence and Normative Guidance
  • Florian Steinberger
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) 98 (2): 306.
‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism
  • Charles Côté-Bouchard
Synthese (2019) 196 (4): 1641.
Deontic modals and hyperintensionality
  • Federico L G Faroldi
Logic Journal of the IGPL (2019) 27 (4): 387.
Decision-theoretic relativity in deontic modality
  • Nate Charlow
Linguistics and Philosophy (2018) 41 (3): 251.
INSTRUMENTAL NORMATIVITY AND THE PRACTICABLE GOOD: A MURDOCHIAN CONSTITUTIVIST ACCOUNT
  • Evgenia Mylonaki
Manuscrito (2018) 41 (4): 349.
  • Online ISSN 1558-1470
  • Print ISSN 0031-8108
  • Copyright © 2025
  • Duke University Press
  • 905 W. Main St. Ste. 18-B
  • Durham, NC 27701
  • USA
  • Phone
  • (888) 651-0122
  • International
  • +1 (919) 688-5134
  • Contact
  • Contact Us
Duke University Press
This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

or Create an Account

Close Modal
Close Modal
This site uses cookies. By continuing to use our website, you are agreeing to our privacy policy.
Accept