This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.

I have had helpful exchanges with dozens of people on the material in this article over the years. For discussion of recent predecessors of this article I am grateful to Huw Price, Mike Titelbaum, audiences at the universities of British Columbia, CCNY, Delaware, Manchester, St. Andrews, Sydney, and York, and two referees for this journal. Support for this project was provided by a PSC-CUNY award, jointly funded by the Professional Staff Congress and the City University of New York.

The text of this article is only available as a PDF.

References

Bartha, Paul; Hitchcock, Christopher.
1999
. “
No One Knows the Date or the Hour: An Unorthodox Application of Rev. Bayes’s Theorem
.”
Philosophy of Science
.
Suppl. 66
:
S229
S353
.
Bostrom, N.
2002
.
Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy
.
New York
:
Routledge
.
Bradley, Darren.
2005
. “
No Doomsday Argument without Knowledge of Birth Rank
.”
Synthese
144
:
91
100
.
———.
2009
. “
Multiple Universes and Observation Selection Effects
.”
American Philosophical Quarterly
46
:
61
72
.
———.
2011a
. “
Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty
.”
British Journal for Philosophy of Science
62
:
323
42
.
———. 2011b. “
Self-Location Is No Problem for Conditionalization
.”
Synthese
182
:
393
411
.
———. Forthcoming. “
Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time
.” In
Attitudes “De Se”: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics
, ed. Feit, A.; Capone, N..
Palo Alto, CA
:
Center for the Study of Language and Information
.
Bradley, Darren; Fitelson, Branden.
2003
. “
Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation
.”
Analysis
63
:
23
31
.
Carter, B.
1974
. “
Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology
.” In
Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Data
, ed. Longair, M. S.,
291
98
.
Dordrecht
:
D. Reidel
.
Colyvan, M.; Garfield, J. L.; Priest, G..
2005
. “
Problems with the Argument from Fine Tuning
.”
Synthese
145
:
325
38
.
Craig, W. L.
1988
. “
Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Design
.”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
38
:
389
95
.
Dieks, D.
1992
. “
Doomsday—Or: The Dangers of Statistics
.”
Philosophical Quarterly
42
:
78
84
.
———.
2007
. “
Reasoning about the Future: Doom and Beauty
.”
Synthese
156
:
427
39
.
Dorr, C. 2002. “
Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga
.”
Analysis
62
:
292
95
.
Draper, Kai; Pust, Joel.
2008
. “
Diachronic Dutch Books and Sleeping Beauty
.”
Synthese
164
:
281
87
.
Eckhardt, W.
Probability Theory and the Doomsday Argument
.”
Mind
102
:
483
88
.
Eddington, A.
1939
.
The Philosophy of Physical Science
.
Cambridge
:
Cambridge University Press
.
Elga, A.
2000
. “
Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem
.”
Analysis
60
:
143
47
.
———.
2004
. “
Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief
.”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
69
:
383
96
.
Greaves, H.
2004
. “
Understanding Deutsch’s Probability in a Deterministic Universe
.”
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
35
:
423
56
.
Hacking, Ian.
1967
. “
Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
.”
Philosophy of Science
34
:
311
25
.
———.
1987
. “
The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy: The Argument from Design. The Anthropic Principle Applied to Wheeler Universes
.”
Mind
,
96
(
383
):
331
40
.
Hitchcock, C.
2004
. “
Beauty and the Bets
.”
Synthese
139
:
405
20
.
Horgan, T.
2004
. “
Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day
.”
Analysis
64
:
10
21
.
———.
2007
. “
Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem
.”
Analysis
67
:
50
59
.
Horwich, P.
1982
.
Probability and Evidence
.
Cambridge
:
Cambridge University Press
.
Howson, Colin; Urbach, Peter.
2006
.
Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach
, 3rd ed.
Chicago
:
Open Court
.
Hutchison, K.
1999
. “
What Are Conditional Probabilities Conditional On?
British Journal for Philosophy of Science
50
:
665
95
.
Juhl, C.
2005
. “
Fine Tuning, Many Worlds, and the ‘Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy
.”’
Nous
39
:
337
47
.
Kopf, T.; Krtous, P.; Page, D. N..
1994
. “
Too Soon for Doom Gloom
.”
Physics preprint
, arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9407002v1.
Kotzen, M. Forthcoming a. “
Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat
.”
Nous
,
doi: 10.1111/j.1468–0068.2010.00824.x.
———. Forthcoming b. “
Selection Biases in Likelihood Arguments
.”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
.
Leslie, J.
1989
.
Universes
.
London
:
Routledge
.
———.
1996
.
The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human Extinction
.
London
:
Routledge
.
Lewis, P. J.
2007
. “
Quantum Sleeping Beauty
.”
Analysis
67
:
59
65
.
———.
2009
. “
Reply to Papineau and Durà-Vilà
.”
Analysis
69
:
86
89
.
———.
2010
. “
A Note on the Doomsday Argument
.”
Analysis
70
:
27
30
.
Maher, Patrick.
2006
. “
The Concept of Inductive Probability
.”
Erkenntnis
65
:
185
206
.
Manson, Neil A.
1989
. “
Why Cosmic Fine-Tuning Still Needs to be Explained
.”
PhD diss.
,
Syracuse University
.
McMullin, E.
1993
. “
Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in Cosmology
.”
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science
24
:
359
89
.
Meacham, C.
2008
. “
Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De Se Belief
.”
Philosophical Studies
138
:
245
69
.
———.
2010
. “
Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Non-Uniqueness and Self-Locating Beliefs
.” In
Oxford Studies in Epistemology
, ed. Gendler, Tamar Szabo; Hawthorne, John,
3
:
86
125
.
Misner, C. W.; Thorne, K. S.; Wheeler, J. A..
1973
.
Gravitation
.
San Francisco
:
W.H. Freeman
.
Monton, B.
2005
. “
God, Fine-Tuning and the Problem of Old Evidence
.”
British Journal for Philosophy of Science
57
:
405
24
.
Olum, K.
2002
. “
The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers
.”
Philosophical Quarterly
52
:
164
84
.
Oppy, G.
2006
.
Arguing about Gods
.
New York
:
Cambridge University Press
.
Papineau, D.
2004
. “
David Lewis and Schrödinger’s Cat
.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
82
:
153
69
.
Papineau, D.; Durà-Vilà, V..
2009a
. “
A Thirder and an Everettian: A Reply to Lewis
.”
Analysis
69
:
78
86
.
———.
2009b
. “
Reply to Lewis: Metaphysics versus Epistemology
.”
Analysis
69
:
89
91
.
Parfit, D.
1998
. “
Why Anything? Why This?
London Review of Books
,
January
22
,
24
7
.
Price, Huw.
2006
. “
Probability in the Everett World: Comments on Wallace and Greaves
.” arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604191.
Salmon, W. C.
1975
. “
Confirmation and Relevance
.” In
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 6, Induction, Probability, and Confirmation
, ed. Maxwell, G.; Anderson, R. M.Jr.,
3
36
.
Minneapolis
:
University of Minnesota Press
.
Santorio, P. Forthcoming. “
Reference and Monstrosity
.”
Philosophical Review
.
Saunders, S.
1998
. “
Time, Quantum Mechanics and Probability
.”
Synthese
114
:
373
404
.
Schwarz, W. Forthcoming. “
Changing Minds in a Changing World
.”
Philosophical Studies
,
doi:10.1007/s11098–011–9699–0
.
Sober, E.
2003
. “
The Design Argument
.” In
God and Design: The Teleological Arguments and Modern Science
, ed. Manson, N.,
24
53
.
London
:
Routledge
.
Stalnaker, R. C.
2008
.
Our Knowledge of the Internal World
.
Oxford, UK
:
Oxford University Press
.
Stuart, A.
1962
.
Basic Ideas of Scientific Sampling
.
London
:
Charles Griffin
.
Susskind, L.
2005
.
The Cosmic Landscape: String Theory and the Illusion of Intelligent Design
.
New York
:
Little, Brown and Co.
Swinburne, R.
1990
. “
Arguments from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe
.” In
Physical Cosmology and Philosophy
, ed. Leslie, J.,
160
79
.
New York
:
MacMillan
.
Titelbaum, M.
2008
. “
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs
.”
Philosophical Review
117
:
555
606
.
———. Forthcoming.
Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Modeling Framework
.
Oxford, UK
:
Oxford University Press
.
Vaidman, L.
2002
. “
Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
.” In
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
, ed. Zalta, Edward. plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/qm-manyworlds/.
van Inwagen, P.
1993
.
Metaphysics
.
Boulder, CO
:
Westview Press
.
Vos Savant, M.
1997
.
The Power of Logical Thinking
.
New York
:
St. Martin’s Griffin
.
Wallace, D.
2006
. “
Epistemology Quantized: Circumstances in Which We Should Come to Believe in the Everett Interpretation
.”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
57
:
655
89
.
Weintraub, R.
2004
. “
Sleeping Beauty: A Simple Solution
.”
Analysis
64
:
8
10
.
Weisberg, J.
2005
. “
Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the Design Argument
.”
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
56
:
809
21
.
White, R.
2000
. “
Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes
.”
Nous
34
:
260
76
.