Many contemporary philosophers hold a version of scientific naturalism, the view according to which (i) scientific ontology is all the ontology there is and (ii) the methods of science are the only legitimate ways of knowing (and consequently all other alleged ways of knowing are either illusory or reducible in principle to the scientific ones). A corollary of this view is that philosophy is continuous with science with respect to subject matter, method, and purposes.
As shown by Lynne Baker in her profound new book, scientific naturalism comes in different versions, depending on how its advocates respond to some crucial open issues. In particular, some of them (such as Philip Pettit) claim, and others (such as Hilary Kornblith and Philip Kitcher) deny, that all sciences are reducible to microphysics. And some (the “disenchanted naturalists,” such as Alex Rosenberg) maintain that the so-called fundamental questions of life disintegrate once they are...
