In Why We Doubt: A Cognitive Account of Our Skeptical Inclinations, Ángel Pinillos makes a strong case for the importance of skeptical doubt, not merely to philosophy but to matters of great practical importance. Contrary to the views of Hume and Peirce, skeptical doubt can arise outside the study; it need not be “fictitious” or “paper” (viii). When it arises, it can have an impact on our willingness to act, individually and collectively. Sometimes its effects are deleterious, such as leading one to think creatively and “outside the box.” But it can lead us astray, such as when it is encouraged, honestly or dishonestly, by those peddling conspiracy theories.
If Pinillos is right about the importance of skeptical doubt, which he plausibly is, we should try to give an account of it as a real-world phenomenon. What Pinillos attempts to provide is a cognitive account. Following David Marr, he...
