Fitting Things Together defends the distinctive normativity of structural rationality, which requires one’s mental states to fit together correctly. More specifically, Worsnip argues that structural rationality is “[a] genuine, [b] autonomous, [c] unified, and [d] normatively significant” (x). (a) and (b) are part of his case for rationality dualism, “the view that structural and substantive rationality are two distinct but equally genuine kinds of rationality, neither … reducible to the other” (4). His account of (c) establishes a link between structural rationality and the metaphysics of attitudes: structurally irrational combinations of attitudes are ones that agents are disposed, owing to the nature of the attitudes at issue, to revise under “full transparency” (133). His take on (d) meshes with this proposal: structural rationality matters because it is fitting to structure deliberation in ways that treat incoherent combinations as “off-limits” (256).

The book has three parts. The first supports...

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