In the postscripts to “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” David Lewis (1986: 118) wrote: “To the question how chance can be reconciled with determinism, …my answer is: it can’t be done.” But a number of philosophers have tried, in the past thirty years or so, to show that Lewis was mistaken. Motives for doing so are not hard to find. Classical gambling systems such as coin flips and dice rolls, to which we ascribe objective probabilities, are arguably deterministic in their dynamics, or nearly so; and one of the two huge areas of physics in which objective probabilities play a crucial role, statistical mechanics, is based on fully deterministic underlying dynamics. Finding a clear account of such probabilities that makes them objective, yet compatible with determinism, has been a chief goal of philosophy of probability, with novel proposals having been defended by David Albert (2000), Barry Loewer (2001),...

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