Mark Schroeder’s latest book delves deeper into the topic of normativity and reasons, while moving his focus from ethics to epistemology. His central aims are, first, to argue that theorizing in normative epistemology profits from comparison with other normative domains (his “Core Hypothesis” [9]); and second, to defend a picture of epistemic normativity that puts reasons first: they can be used to explain and analyze all other epistemic normative phenomena.

Part 1 of the book provides a compelling account of normative reasons as competitors (which compete in determining, for instance, what one ought to do or believe) that are act-oriented rather than outcome-oriented, and can be acted on (my reasons to φ can be the reasons for which I φ). Schroeder assumes that there are both objective reasons, which bear on the correctness of belief, and subjective reasons, which determine its rationality or justification.

Part 2 aims to...

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