A singular term like ‘Socrates’, if all goes well, refers to an object. That is what a singular term is for. What about a predicate, like ‘is wise’? Does it refer to something, too? And if so, can the referent of a predicate also be referred to by a singular term? The first half of Robert Trueman’s Properties and Propositions (henceforth, PP) is devoted to a presentation and defense of answers to these questions and several others closely related to them. Jointly, these answers constitute a view Trueman calls Fregean realism (FR). The second half of the book puts that view to work, using it to try to resolve a range of long-standing puzzles connected to the topic of predicates and their putative worldly correlates, such as the paradox of the concept horse, the problem of universals, and Bradley’s regress, as well as to answer some difficult questions about...

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