In this book, Thomas Kroedel develops a novel account of mental causation, allegedly available to both nonreductive physicalists and naturalistic dualists. This account draws on the difference-making ideas of causation, including Lewis’s classical counterfactual theory as well as the more recent causal modeling approaches. This book is rich, engaging, and clearly written. Although I have some worries about the main arguments (as I will explain later), I like many parts of the book, such as a defense of mental causation in the antireductionist framework, criticisms of transference approaches to causation, and an equal emphasis on the causal roles of events and those of properties.

In chapter 2, Kroedel argues for mental-physical causation from the perspective of nonreductive physicalism, which is defined as the view that mental properties strongly supervene on, but nonidentical with, physical properties. The central argument in section 2.2 goes as follows:

  • [1] Necessarily, M is instantiated if...

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