It is incumbent upon philosophers of mind and epistemologists alike to study the links between perceptual experience and empirical reasoning. What one thinks about the nature of perception inevitably influences one’s view of empirical reasoning (and vice versa). For philosophers like Donald Davidson (1986), who argue that experience consists in brute sensations, perception can, at best, causally impact empirical beliefs. This leads Davidson to a coherentism about empirical justification and content. John McDowell (1994), on the other hand, pressing the worry that such coherentism amounts to “frictionless spinning in the void” and empty thoughts, argues that we must endorse a view on which experience is simultaneously receptive and conceptually articulated. Susanna Siegel (2016), more recently, has argued that our beliefs, desires, and prejudices can reach down and shape the character of our experiences, thereby making our perceptions themselves “epistemically charged.”

It is a central virtue of Anil Gupta’s work that...

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