The Explainability of Experience: Realism and Subjectivity in Spinoza's Theory of the Human Mind by Ursula Renz first appeared in German (Renz 2010) and was awarded the Journal of the History of Philosophy Book Prize in 2011. It was translated by the author into English. The first, but not the only, admirable feature of the book is that it does not read as a translation. The long wait for the translation was indeed well worthwhile.
One of the more striking features of Spinoza's metaphysics is that its most fundamental doctrines have been interpreted in diametrically opposing ways. A canonical example is Spinoza's being accused of being a materialist and atheist (see, e.g., Conway 1996: chap. 9) only to be interpreted later as an idealist and accused of denying any reality to finite things (as did Hegel; see, e.g., Hegel 2010: 328). A second but not independent...
