Consider the color character of your visual experience of a gray patch. We communicate about this character with the following ‘looks’ sentence:

  • (1) The patch looks gray to you.

Perhaps, then, we can better understand what it is to have a visual experience with this character by examining the meaning of (1). And if this method extends to other characters of visual experience, then we can learn about visual experience in general through the study of ‘looks’ sentences. This is the “semantic approach” to visual experience promised in the title of Wylie Breckenridge's thought-provoking monograph. It leads him to two key theses: first, the character of a visual experience is the way that experience is occurring (i.e., adverbialism is true); second, visual experience does not have representational content (i.e., representationalism is false).

After the introductory chapter 1, Breckenridge turns, in chapter 2, to show...

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