Laura Papish's new book is part of a recent surge of interest in Kant's theory of evil. What sets it apart, however, is her focused attention on the nature of self-deception and its relationship to moral evil on the one hand, and their correlates of self-cognition and moral reform on the other. Highly original and steeped in the literature, Papish's book is a thought-provoking contribution to the debate.

Papish begins by taking up the problem of moral evil and the hedonistic theory of nonmoral motivation underlying it. One challenge Kantians face in this regard is how to explain cases of evil, like suicide bombers, that don't appear to be motivated by a desire for pleasure. Andrews Reath (1989), among others, has responded by attempting to show how the set of nonmoral incentives can be expanded beyond mere hedonistic self-love. Papish, however, thinks this...

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