Epistemic consequentialism is the view that (at least some) features of epistemic rationality can be explained in terms of features of epistemic value. The standard framework is decision-theoretic: consider an agent who has a menu of doxastic options (credal-states, belief-states, or plans to update them) and a purely epistemic utility function (standardly, a measure of accuracy). What option should they choose to optimally promote epistemic utility?

Epistemic consequentialism is a hot topic, for it offers a rare combination of (1) a fruitful, tractable framework that (appears to) provide insight into both old and new questions; and (2) apparently devastating problems that (threaten to) undermine any such insight. This combination has sustained a breakneck literature, with sympathizers claiming ever more insights, objectors claiming ever more problems, sympathizers offering ever more sophisticated responses to those problems, and so on.

On the side of the sympathizers, we do seem to learn something when...

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