Few would now dispute the claim that Franz Brentano (1838–1917) is a central figure in both the analytic and phenomenological philosophical traditions. The phenomenological tradition may be said to have done him justice; the analytic tradition still has some catching up to do. So it’s pleasing to report that two recent books on Brentano, Uriah Kriegel’s Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, and Value and Mark Textor’s Brentano’s Mind, constitute a valuable advance (Chisholm 1957, 1986; Crane 2006; Moran 1996; B. Smith 1994; and D. Smith 1986 are among previous significant contributions). Both provide clear and detailed expositions of Brentano’s work with plenty of historical context, and both bring out the continuing relevance of Brentano’s philosophy by contrasting his views with current views, particularly in analytic philosophy. Neither author thinks Brentano got everything right; both believe he got an awful lot right. Both books testify...

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