Central to Kant’s moral philosophy is the compelling thought that for a rational creature to be free is to do what she has most reason to do. For Kant, it is a ‘fact of reason’ that we always have most reason to do what the moral law requires of us. Accordingly, we are free in Kant’s view insofar as we are autonomous: that is, insofar as we determine ourselves to follow the moral law. In Fichte’s ethics, too, the freedom of rational agents plays a crucial role. Furthermore, like Kant, Fichte takes such freedom to consist in autonomy, though he typically prefers alternative terms such as ‘independence’ or ‘self-sufficiency’. However, according to Michelle Kosch’s reading of Fichte presented in Fichte’s Ethics, behind such surface similarity with Kant lies a fundamentally different moral outlook. One of the most remarkable accomplishments of Kosch’s book is that it demonstrates just how different...

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