Bradley Armour-Garb's new collection, Reflections on the Liar, brings together a number of essays by accomplished authors who have not previously brought their talents sustainedly to bear on the Liar paradox. The volume thus presents an opportunity for scholars of the paradox to view the Liar from the perspectives of other related areas of philosophy. Among the many illuminating contributions, I will limit my focus to the four about which I have the most to say.
Ian Rumfitt's contribution centers on a version of the Liar paradox that he formulates without invoking truth, from which he concludes that the Liar is “centrally about the limits of what can be said, and only derivatively about truth” (198). To obtain the Liar without truth, Rumfitt admits an infinite class of objectual variables P, Q, R, . . . that can take only the sentence position and that range...
