The consensus in the philosophy of science, at least since the 1980s, has been that Hempel's covering law model fails largely because it ignores the central role of causation in scientific explanation. Most subsequent work on scientific explanation has focused on understanding how causal (Salmon 1984; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008) and mechanistic (Craver 2007) explanations work. Some have even asserted, perhaps in incautious moments, that all scientific explanations are causal (Sober 1984; Lewis 1986). Lange's collection of expanded, mostly previously published essays, packed with numerous, beautiful examples of putatively noncausal explanations from biology, physics, and mathematics, challenges this increasingly ossified consensus and, in so doing, launches a new field of philosophic investigation.

...

Lange defines noncausal explanations negatively as those that don't work “in virtue of describing the world's network of causal relations” (xi). He identifies...

You do not currently have access to this content.