In this well-researched, philosophically rich book, R. Lanier Anderson provides a novel, compelling reconstruction of the historical context for the emergence of Kant's formative distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. After an introduction that provides helpful orientation for what follows, Anderson devotes close attention to Kant's predecessors (especially Leibniz and Wolff, also Locke and Hume) to chart out Kant's grounds for dissatisfaction with the then-common accounts (“logics”) of the nature of concepts, judgments, truth, and knowledge (part I). Anderson then recounts the long, arduous path in the 1760s and 1770s that finally brought Kant to the canonical formulation of the analytic/synthetic distinction in the first Critique (part II). Anderson then artfully draws on this illuminating historico-critical presentation to highlight new and underappreciated dimensions of Kant's appeals to the analytic/synthetic distinction, both in Kant's critiques of previous accounts of mathematical cognition (part III), metaphysical cognition (part IV), and empirical cognition (epilogue),...
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Book Review| July 01 2018
The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics
Anderson, R. Lanier,
The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press,
xviii + 408 pp.
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (3): 399–403.
Clinton Tolley; The Poverty of Conceptual Truth: Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of Metaphysics. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2018; 127 (3): 399–403. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-6718810
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