In The Sources of Normativity and elsewhere, Korsgaard defends a Kantian ethical theory by arguing that valuing anything commits one to valuing humanity as the source of all value. I reconstruct Korsgaard's influential argument to show how she can resist many of the objections that critics have raised. I also show how the argument fails because, at a crucial point, it begs the question in favor of the value of humanity. It thus fails for internal reasons that do not depend on rejecting Korsgaard's metaethical constructivism or her conception of rational agency.
Research Article| April 01 2018
Korsgaard's Arguments for the Value of HumanityKorsgaard's Arguments for the Value of HumanityMichael Bukoski
The Philosophical Review (2018) 127 (2): 197–224.
Michael Bukoski; Korsgaard's Arguments for the Value of Humanity
Korsgaard's Arguments for the Value of Humanity
Michael Bukoski. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2018; 127 (2): 197–224. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-4326604
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