This essay attempts to provide and defend what may be the first actual argument in support of P. F. Strawson's merely stated vision of a response-dependent theory of moral responsibility. It does so by way of an extended analogy with the funny. In part 1, it makes the easier and less controversial case for response-dependence about the funny. In part 2, it shows the tight analogy between anger and amusement in developing the harder and more controversial case for response-dependence about a kind of blameworthiness (and so response-dependence about a kind of responsibility). It then defends the view from three serious skeptical challenges.
Research Article|October 01 2017
Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to BlameResponse-Dependent ResponsibilityDavid Shoemaker
The Philosophical Review (2017) 126 (4): 481-527.
David Shoemaker; Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame
David Shoemaker. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2017; 126 (4): 481–527. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-4173422
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