This is a rich, ambitious, and original study. Graciela De Pierris aims to give a new account of the relationship between Hume's skepticism and his naturalism. Notoriously, Hume gives skeptical arguments targeting our best methods of inquiry, such as inductive reasoning. So, how can he—in good intellectual conscience—endorse and rely on those very methods, in his own naturalistic investigation of the human mind (his “science of man”)? Some scholars answer that, despite his skeptical arguments, Hume does not ultimately conclude that we lack justification for beliefs formed through induction or the other methods of inquiry that he employs as a scientist of man. Others answer that his skeptical arguments do not target his own preferred conception of these methods.

De Pierris rejects both of these approaches. In her view, Hume argues for a form of skepticism that is “radical,” in that it targets his...

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