Epistemic contextualism (EC) is the view that what's expressed by claims of the form ‘S knows [/doesn't know] that p’ depends on such factors as the interests, purposes, and expectations of the speaker. While EC has “been met with overwhelming scepticism by a vast majority of epistemologists and philosophers of language” (1), according to Michael Blome-Tillmann, this is largely owing to shortcomings of extant versions of the view.1 Blome-Tillmann's primary aim here is to present a contextualist semantics for ‘knows’ that's superior to other such proposals—one, moreover, that sheds light on central epistemological issues.

The preferred semantics for ‘knows’, which Blome-Tillmann has been developing and defending over several recent papers, is Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism (PEC), the main inspirations for which are found in the work of David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. Working, like Lewis, within a relevant-alternatives framework, Blome-Tillmann proposes that...

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