Luck egalitarianism—the thought that unchosen forms of advantage are presumptively unjust—has not been the most fashionable view as of late. The rise of the “democratic equality” of Elizabeth Anderson—along with the continuing influence of John Rawls's own political view of justice—have contributed to the sense that luck egalitarianism is simply too blunt an instrument with which to analyze social and political justice. Kok-Chor Tan attempts, in this recent book, to develop a chastened and moderate luck egalitarianism, one that might demonstrate why luck egalitarianism is attractive—and how it can defend itself against its critics.

The book is a model of clarity and rigor; it is a thin volume, but it manages to cover several decades of recent thinking about social justice, and do so with grace and accuracy. It would be of use, even if Tan's own arguments were rejected, as a useful supplement...

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