Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses the notion of a “completely satisfactory explanation” to shed light on the logic of ground in the presence of self-reference. This allows us to develop a satisfactory logic of ground and recover a sense in which grounding is still an internal relation.
Research Article|October 01 2015
Jon Erling Litland; Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2015; 124 (4): 481–532. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3147011
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