Autonomy plays an essential role in Kant's practical philosophy. In metaethical contexts, it grounds the authority of moral requirements, and in metaphysical and moral contexts, it grounds the inviolable dignity of rational beings. Kant's German idealist successors enthusiastically modify and expand his conception of autonomy, though Anglo-American philosophers mostly ignore it (Mill being a noteworthy exception) until a resurgence of interest in the second half of the twentieth century. Today, autonomy is an important topic in ethics, applied ethics, and social and political philosophy, especially in debates over moral responsibility, political legitimacy, and public policy. It is quite flexible in its employment and can refer to the capacity to make one's own decisions, the right to make those decisions, or to an ideal whereby one possesses the material and psychological resources sufficient for a satisfactory life. While these contemporary conceptions of autonomy are often...
Benjamin S. Yost; Kant on Moral Autonomy. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2015; 124 (2): 263–268. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2845782
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