In this short but rich book, Antonia LoLordo explores Locke's account of moral agency. For Locke, to be a “moral man” is to be a free, rational person. LoLordo devotes one chapter each to his accounts of liberty, persons, and rationality, in that order. These follow an introduction that is, in effect, another short chapter on Locke's account of natural law.

In chapter 1, LoLordo argues that Locke thinks of nonhuman animals as possessing thought, some degree of reason, and even the power to will. She says that animals fail to qualify as moral agents for Locke because they lack the ability to suspend the prosecution of their desires and to deliberate about the best course of action. Indeed, on LoLordo's view, we can say that this is all that keeps animals from counting as moral men, because anything capable of suspension and deliberation...

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