Anyone familiar with his work over the past fifty years knows that ‘Richard Swinburne’ means systematicity, and his latest contribution, Mind, Brain, and Free Will, fits the mold. In this ambitious work, Swinburne aims to defend two of the most controversial, and often derided, theories in philosophy of mind and action: substance dualism and agent-causation. Swinburne defends a host of provocative claims, though I suspect the following six will be of most interest to readers: (i) mental properties and events are distinct from and do not supervene on physical properties and events; (ii) a human being is a pure mental substance, having only its soul as an essential part; (iii) souls and bodies causally interact; (iv) no experimental results do or could show that our intentions never cause any brain events; (v) in intentional causation, the cause is the mental substance who has the intention, not events involving the...

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