In his superb book The Conscious Brain, Prinz defends a theory of consciousness: a theory that (among other things) tells us what kind of thing consciousness is, what distinguishes different kinds of conscious states, and how consciousness is implemented in the human brain. Prinz's view is that conscious experiences are attended intermediate-level perceptual representations. Intermediate-level representations are, roughly, the kinds of representations that Marr (1982) had in mind when he discussed the “2 ½ D sketch”: a 3D world is represented, but not in a way that abstracts from the viewpoint of the observer. For Prinz, such a representation is attended just if the information it represents is accessible to one of the set of postperceptual systems known as “working memory.” The relevant representations are “vectorwaves” (coordinated patterns of neural firing that code information about features of the environment), and their attentive availability...
Geoffrey Lee; The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2015; 124 (1): 163–167. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2812711
Download citation file: