Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues that Lewis's treatment of two of Parfit's puzzle cases—degreed survival and fission—presuppose different nonclassical treatments of belief and desire.
Research Article| October 01 2014
Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate SurvivalNonclassical Minds and Indeterminate SurvivalJ. Robert G. Williams
The Philosophical Review (2014) 123 (4): 379–428.
J. Robert G. Williams; Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival
Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival
J. Robert G. Williams. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2014; 123 (4): 379–428. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2749710
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