Constructivists aim to account for the semantics or metaphysics of (part or all of) normativity. Against realists, and along with expressivists and subjectivists, constructivists argue that there are no relevant normative facts or truths independent of the practical standpoint of some agent(s). Constructivists hold that normative reality or truth is “constructed” by means of a specified procedure or otherwise arises from agents' deliberative activity or self-conception.

For constructivism to be a genuine alternative to apparent metaethical rivals requires that its ambitions be global, encompassing all (practical) normativity. By contrast, local constructivisms restrict themselves to accounting for some subregion(s) of normativity, allowing that nonconstructed normative principles guide the construction of morality or justice, for example. One of the most fundamental questions about constructivism is whether it can be both a distinctive and plausible metaethical view. Some of the best essays in this collection argue...

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