José Zalabardo takes an unusual approach to skepticism in this book. Most epistemologists acknowledge the force of skepticism but aim to mitigate its threat. Zalabardo tells us that he undertook to show that “our philosophical outlook was incompatible with some of our most cherished knowledge claims” (vii). He found that reliabilism presented “the main obstacle to a cogent sceptical argument” (vii), and so he set out to discover some important type of knowledge that was not skeptic proof. He thinks he's found it. More exactly, he argues that reflective beliefs, or cognitive self-approvals (CSAs), are unknowable on what is otherwise the most plausible, antiskeptical theory of knowledge.

According to Zalabardo's original version of reliabilism, there are three types of knowledge: foundational, truth-tracking knowledge; evidence-based inferential knowledge; and knowledge where one simply has a true standing belief, that is, when one has an “innate predisposition to form [a belief] that is...

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