To give a complete and completely consistent account of Pyrrhonian skepticism as it is found in the pages of Sextus Empiricus is no small task, perhaps even a Sisyphean one. It is for just this reason that, in The Demands of Reason, Casey Perin distances himself from any such endeavor, freely admitting that his account of Pyrrhonian skepticism is not a comprehensive one (5–6). Instead, what Perin sets out to do, and does well, is to focus on four aspects of Pyrrhonian skepticism that emerge from a consideration of Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism (hereafter PH) that he thinks are of particular philosophical significance.1 They are: the issue of whether the skeptic is committed to searching for truth; the issue of whether the skeptic is committed to certain principles of rationality; the scope of the skeptic's skepticism; and the connection between skepticism...

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