This splendid book makes several major contributions to the philosophy of mind. It is concerned principally with phenomenal consciousness, but it also has very useful things to say about a range of other topics, including representation, causation, causal exclusion, reduction, constitution, and the question of whether, and if so how, relational properties are grounded in intrinsic properties. It is innovative, deep, clear, judicious, and carefully argued, and it has many passages that illuminate classical texts and the contemporary literature. I will devote a section to each of its three main themes.

In the first four chapters, Pereboom is principally concerned with a proposition he calls the qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis. According to this proposition, “our introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and…these properties actually lack such...

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