When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest.
Research Article| July 01 2013
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of PropositionsEpistemic Teleology and the Separateness of PropositionsSelim Berker
The Philosophical Review (2013) 122 (3): 337–393.
Selim Berker; Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Selim Berker. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2013; 122 (3): 337–393. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2087645
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