In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review, “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect that truth depends on the world and not the other way around. The present essay argues that mere invocation of this truism does not establish that the basic argument for incompatibilism is question-begging. Further, it seeks to clarify important elements of the debate, including the fixity-of-the-past premise in the incompatibilist's argument and the Ockhamist response. It sketches some potential links between the issues here and recent work on ontological dependence, and it connects the issues raised by Merricks to important work that has appeared in (among other places) the Philosophical Review.
Skip Nav Destination
Research Article| January 01 2011
The Truth About Freedom: A Reply to Merricks
The Philosophical Review (2011) 120 (1): 97–115.
John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd; The Truth About Freedom: A Reply to Merricks. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2011; 120 (1): 97–115. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2010-025
Download citation file: