...M. Ladd Thomas Copyright © 1955 by Duke University Press 1955 THE SOURCES OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY M. Ladd Thomas SINCE IT EMERGED as a state in 1949 Indonesia has refused to align itself either with the Western or the Communist powers. It refused to bow to American pressure...

...Jonathan S. Parhusip Local labor laws in Taiwan push migrant workers to run away from contracted employment arrangements and become undocumented. This article examines the common forms of struggle pursued by runaway Indonesian migrant workers with a focus on the informal organizational structures...

...Eben Kirksey Indigenous people from West Papua, a territory under Indonesian rule, are foraging for food in spaces by the side of the road, in the ruins of recently logged forests. Living on the margins of market economies and transportation infrastructures comes with opportunities as well as risks...

... of all of the major Indonesian policy turns in the last few years and a principal reason why the country is now no nearer to a solution of its problems than in December, 1949, when a Dutch Socialist government formally granted Indonesia independence at the end of a four-year, militarily unsuccessful...

... <tnd the problem of creating some semblance of national unity out of the welter of races and peoples, each with its own cultural level, who inhabit the archipelago. In the first five years of national independence Indonesia has made considerable progress in solving many of these problems. Yet today the observer of the Indonesian scene is struck by the existence of peculiar and dangerous paradoxes in virtually every field of national life, paradoxes that are sources of continued unrest at home and suspicion abroad. For some Indonesians the question lies in the seeming inability of the country to implement its revolutionary ob­ jectives. As a leading member of the small but influential Socialist party informed me in Djakarta, July, 1954: The trouble is that our people have no political sophistication. They still think that because they are free all other things become possible, and they cannot under- Indonesia: Paradoxes of Independence 313 stand why our leaders seem to deviate from the principles of the fight for freedom. This view undoubtedly touches an important aspect of the problem. But it would appear that Indonesia s present political and economic plight stems also from inherent weaknesses in the revolutionary ideology itself, which is incompatible with the harsh reality of the country s present condition. Presumably the revolution was fought to obtain political freedom, yet today there are glaring anomalies in the application of that free­ dom. In the absence of an elected national legislature and in view of the emergency law-making powers of the executive, the present Indo­ nesian government often appears to be operating in a vacuum. In the period 1950-1953 no less than 92 laws were promulgated by the executive under its emergency powers as compared to 100 enacted by the provisional parliament, though in the past two years the num­ ber of emergency laws has decreased. National elections have been repeatedly promised and as repeatedly postponed. The present cabinet of Ali Sastroamijojo in the past year laid the groundwork for Indonesia s first general election, scheduled originally for the early months of 1955. But registration of voters and construction of elec­ tion machinery is so far behind schedule that probably no election will be possible before the latter part of 1955, if then. Perhaps even more dangerous are the extreme centralization of government and the absence of any definite regulations governing the relationship be­ tween the central government and the local and regional councils. Local government was essentially the product of Dutch colonial policy and had as its basis the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Indonesian people. Nationalists have generally denounced this regionalism as a cloak for a colonial divide and rule policy. The result is that today the outlying provinces and districts, referred to as daerah, find themselves in constant opposition to the central govern­ ment s measures and that local autonomy under present circumstances is a sham. The Indonesian press reverberates with complaints from the daerah that they have no freedom to handle their own affairs and that the central treasury is draining them of wealth. In the words of Muhammad Sape i, acting daerah chief of West Java prov­ ince, February 2, 1954: In my opinion, there is no greater danger to the Indonesian Republic than the dictatorial centralism that has lately come into existence. In the past year, a host of deputations from the daerah have visited Djakarta to demand real autonomy and to pro- 314 The South Atlantic Quarterly test against the appointments policy of the central government. There has been severe criticism of the decision to strengthen the authority of the officials of the central civil service. Nor have these protests been confined to areas beyond Java. In the middle of 1954 the central government decided to increase the members of the city coun­ cil of Djakarta from 25 to 60 by executive appointment of the cabinet, notwithstanding the fact that city council elections had been held since the colonial period and that election machinery for a new city election was all but completed. Opposition from major political groups such as the Masjumi (Moslem) party was immediate and vociferous but had no success. The Interior Affairs Minister ad­ mitted that this means of broadening the council was perhaps not the most desirable, but justified it under the circumstances. The government s excessive centralist policies have occasioned armed rebellion. There was an insurrection in the southern Moluccas in eastern Indonesia (1950-1952), where the population viewed with distrust the abolition of the component state of East Indonesia and feared for its political rights in a centralized state. Some of the sepa­ ratist elements on the island of Sulawesi (Celebes) seem to have supported Muslim fanatics in their fight against the central authori­ ties. More recently (1953-1954), there was a rebellion in Acheh, north Sumatra, caused to a large extent by dissatisfaction over the lack of regional self-rule. The present cabinet, despite repeated promises of meaningful local freedom, in fact places in the hands of the central government responsibility for most decisions in the daerah. Recently in many areas trusted provincial governors have been re­ placed by executive appointment. In Palembang, South Sumatra, repeated dynamite explosions were set off in protest against the trans­ fer of the governor of that province. Thus in the first five years of national independence the Republic has witnessed the disheartening spectacle of Indonesians fighting Indonesians for political freedom. Another objective of the revolution was to establish democracy. For decades, nationalists railed against the colonial government for not providing Indonesia with a truly representative body in which Indonesians could make their own laws. With national independence a reality, parliamentary government seems as remote as ever. There are several reasons for this. There are in Indonesia today more than twenty-five political parties, a factor which tends to impede the de­ velopment of responsible party operations. Most of these parties Indonesia: Paradoxes of Independence 315 are small and lack any semblance of mass support. They have been able to obtain a position of prominence because, in the absence of a general election, some care had to be taken to make the provisional national parliament as representative as possible of political life. The 200-odd members of the provisional parliament are appointed by the respective party leaders; the number of seats allotted to each party is determined by the executive. For this reason most parties have obtained seats, even those that would under normal circumstances not be entitled to any. There is also a practice of allowing parlia­ mentary committees to consist of members of every party, including the smaller ones. Some of these smaller parties, many of them ex­ tremely radical in character, have followed a policy of obstructing and delaying the holding of general elections. They seem to have been instrumental in bringing down the cabinet of premier Wilopo in the middle of 1953, when it became clear that Wilopo wished to have elections held as soon as possible. In these tactics the smaller parties are assisted by a segment of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party), which, along with the Masjumi party, is the largest in the country. For the past two years it has been generally believed that in an election the Masjumi party would tri­ umph, since the PNI, an old standard bearer of nationalism, has greatly lost in strength. At present the parliamentary anomaly is most conspicuous in the distribution of seats, the PNI having ap­ proximately the same number of deputies as the Masjumi. While all parties piously voice their approval of speedy general elections, some groups seem to continue their obstructionist tactics in their own in­ terest. Party opportunism in defiance of democratic priciples has been augmented by a sharp polarization of extremes. The anti-Communist Masjumi party and the PNI, which has established some kind of rap­ prochement with the Indonesian Communist party, are the chief protagonists of this battle. In the increasingly bitter interparty strug­ gle the smaller parties are drawn to either of the opposite poles. The Socialists and some members of the Christian confessional parties support Masjumi, while the radical labor party (Buruh), the national Communists (Murbah), and some conservative groups like the PIR support the PNI. Not only the control over parliament, but the en­ tire future structure of the Indonesian state is at stake in this contest. Masjumi and some smaller Muslim parties that for tactical reasons 316 The South Atlantic Quarterly oppose Masjumi favor the establishment of an Islamic state in Indo­ nesia, with due allowance of freedom for other religious groups, but the PNI, the PIR, and the Communists oppose this and wish to give the state a secular orientation. Since it is evident that Masjumi has at present the greatest degree of mass support, spokesmen of other parties such as the PIR have urged postponement of the general election in the hope that public opinion may change in favor of a secular state. All recent cabinets have advocated changing the Indonesian eco­ nomic structure from a colonial to a national one, i. e., that Indo­ nesians have a greater share in the exploitation of natural resources and business opportunities, that the operations of European and Chinese import-export concerns be curtailed, that restrictions be placed on foreign capital and its transfers abroad. This objective is desirable, but to reach it the government has followed a policy which has had the opposite result. For example, Indonesia is one of the major rub­ ber producers of the world; with the recent slump in rubber prices following the Korean truce, rubber is cheap and relatively abundant. But many Indonesian industries that require quantities of rubber, such as those producing tires, soles, and sports articles, are unable to operate because of difficulties in importing chemicals and other materials needed by these plants. The bottleneck is the import business. In order to promote the growth of native Indonesian import agencies, the government has granted them monopolies and special import li­ censes. Since these native agencies lack capital, business connections, and administrative experience and since the government has restricted the import of goods on credit, the agencies cannot meet the needs of the home rubber industry. As if to aggravate the situation, the Eco­ nomic Affairs Minister recently announced that henceforth 70 per cent of all imports would have to go through agencies owned by nativeborn Indonesian citizens; 15 per cent would be allowed to pass through agencies owned by non-native-born Indonesian citizens; only 15 per cent was allowed foreigners. A similar division is contemplated for the ownership of all private business capital. This measure, direct­ ed against the Chinese and Europeans, many of whom are Indonesian citizens, sets up discriminatory standards of citizenship and harms the economy still further. The problems of Indonesian industry reflect the precarious fi­ nancial position of the country as a whole and the dangers of the Indonesia: Paradoxes oj Independence 317 present government s fiscal policy. The annual report for 1953 on Indonesia s economy, written by members of Indonesia s National Planning Bureau, points out that the huge deficits in the government s budget are the weak spot in Indonesia s economy, inasmuch as they distort the monetary balance and increase the possibilities of in­ flation. A run-away inflation in 1953 was prevented because pro­ duction increased slightly and because the government made free use of foreign exchange reserves. But Indonesia s reserve position (gold and foreign currencies) has progressively worsened. December 31, 1951, reserves amounted to 6.1 billion rupiah; in December 31, 1953, they had sunk to 2 billion (1 rupiah roughly equals 1 x United States cents) and are still declining. The declining reserve has affected seriously the coverage for the domestic currency in circulation. The law requires a minimum coverage of 20 per cent, though in case of an emergency this can be lowered for a short time. By State Decree No. 58, July 20, 1954, the coverage was lowered to 15 per cent for a specified short period. This minimum coverage, the report goes on to say, has a psychological significance, in that it encourages public confidence in the currency. But there is another and more important reason for adequate coverage, namely, that gold and foreign currency reserves are needed to finance foreign trade. If a country does not possess working capital for its foreign trade, foreign payment obliga­ tions will then have to be met out of current export receipts, which, because of seasonal fluctuations, would be difficult if not impossible, thus seriously hampering imports. If possible, concludes the report, the further use of reserves must be stopped by lowering expendi­ tures, i. e., by cutting down on the consumption level, although it has not been possible to realize this goal under present conditions. Under the circumstances, Indonesia requires greater opportunities to earn foreign exchange, but, in view of her heavy reliance on just a few agrarian and mineral exports highly susceptible to world-market fluctuations (e.g., rubber, tin, tobacco, sugar) and in the absence of a world authority stabilizing prices for these exports, this appears ex­ tremely difficult. To build a more diversified economic production apparatus as quickly as possible is, therefore, of the essence. But this requires capital which Indonesia does not possess; she must, therefore, turn to foreign investors. Over and over leading Indo­ nesian officials from the President down have said that they welcome private foreign capital, but the actual policies toward foreign holdings 318 The South Atlantic Quarterly contradict these public utterances. Crippling labor unrest, strikes that are illegal even by government standards, a vastly decreased labor productivity which the government seems unwilling to raise, ex­ orbitant taxes on transfer payment of services, restrictions on foreignexchange payment, continued and illegal occupation by Indonesian peasants of land owned by Western rubber, tobacco, and sugar estates, theft of produce from the estates, threats of nationalization all these factors and more have the effect of frightening away foreign capital. Some Indonesian leaders are well aware of the dangers involved. Former Premier Mohammad Natsir, chairman of the Masjumi party,, declared, August 8, 1954, that the financial policies of the present government were approaching a point when the government would be unable to pay the salaries of its own officials; he also held up the efficient operations of foreign enterprises as an example to the cabinet. Far from continuing to invest in Indonesia, foreign corporations are in fact increasingly placing their investments elsewhere. Some Western estates, preparatory to abandoning their holdings, neglect their lands, rubber trees are not properly cared for, and the estate labor force is being sharply reduced in some areas, all of which has given rise to new labor agitation. Estate rubber exports from Su­ matra fell sharply in 1954, reflecting the lowered production of rub­ ber estates. About half of the rubber trees in the estate area are over twenty years old; no new ones are being planted because the estates fear for their holdings. Contrary to widespread popular expecta­ tions that economic prosperity would follow in the wake of national independence, recent surveys indicate a diminishing welfare in terms of prewar standards. Real per-capita income in 1952 was 15 per cent less than in 1938, the last more or less normal prewar year, while the cost of living in that period rose thirty times. In many areas of Indo­ nesia, especially in Java, the plight of the peasant and rural worker is in fact comparable to that of the period of the great depression of the 1930 s. Disillusionment is making way for a sullen apathy, in sharp contrast to the buoyant idealism of the revolutionary period, or is leading to lawlessness and a growing radicalism, especially among the proletariat. Vice-President Mohammad Hatta in an important address, July 14, 1954, admitted that Indonesia was not as yet ripe for democracy and that the country in its present political develop­ ment is exhibiting anarchistic tendencies. Indonesia: Paradoxes of Independence 319 As a result of existing political and economic tensions, criticism of the government or political movements in press and public gatherings is increasingly hazardous, leading sometimes to violence and often resulting in an even more embittered atmosphere. In the latter part of 1953 a member of the PNI and a member of the Marxist group, Permai, each made speeches attacking the Islam State, supposedly criticizing the Prophet Mohammed. A protest movement began at once, supported by city mobs, though few had never read the address­ es in question. Demonstrations in such cities as Bandjermassin and Makassar culminated in a huge protest rally in Djakarta in early February, 1954, in which more than a half a million persons partici­ pated. Apparently the police had no prior notice of the demonstra­ tion ; at any rate it proved powerless to keep it within safe bounds. Subsequently, the PNI member who had made the address was criminally prosecuted on grounds of having insulted an established religion. A few months later a Muslim spokesman was examined for possible criminal prosecution on identical grounds. The speaker, Kasman Singodimedjo, vice-chairman of the Masjumi party, stated in a public address in the Moluccas that only the ideology of Islam was God-given; the doctrines of Christianity, Marxism, and of the PNI were all man made. Objections from Christian groups spurred an investigation by the attorney-general s office, though Kasman denied any derogatory intentions. President Sukarno openly de­ plored Kasman s remarks. These two issues, intimately involved in the dispute over the possible establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, have contributed greatly to the tension between Muslims and secularists and impede the growth of much needed public tolerance in religious and political life. This tension is reflected in official religious policy. . In theorythere is complete religious freedom, constitutionally guaranteed; in practice certain anomalies appear, arising from the dominant position of Islam in Indonesia. For example, the Indonesian government has been reluctant to grant entry visas to foreign Roman Catholic priests and missionaries, though according to a statement of the Papal Nun­ cio, these are badly needed to serve the needs of Indonesia s one and a half million Catholics. In May, 1954, the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs reaffirmed an earlier statement made by its secretarygeneral on the subject of religious freedom, that the government is of the opinion that Indonesia no longer requires new foreign mis- 320 The South Atlantic Quarterly sions. Furthermore, the government does not allow representatives of religions that did not earlier have followers in Indonesia to come into the country to propagate their faith. Hence, a propagandist of the Baha i faith was denied admission. The government has also taken a somewhat equivocal position with respect to the Hindu re­ ligion as it now flourishes on the island of Bali. Under the circum­ stances, the application of the principle of religious freedom leaves something to be desired. In the colonial period, the government often exercised severe censorship over the press, prohibiting nationalist utterances endanger­ ing the general peace and order. Some of these censorship laws are still in force, and on more than one occasion the national govern­ ment has applied them rigorously. October 14, 1953, the Indonesian attorney-general informed the national journalists association that writers of press reports, even on parliamentary debates or statements of officials, which had the effect of creating unrest and dissension, would be liable to prosecution. Journalists were thus placed in the unenviable position of having to determine in advance whether or not the writing of an acurate report on a public occurrence might land them in jail. As the Djakarta daily Nieuwsgier put it editorially (October 17, 1953): It is virtually an impossible task for a journalist, who is trying to give an accurate picture of what is taking place here, to determine in advance, again and again, if the report of a certain pronouncement or the publication of a news item will lead to disunity and enmity. . . . There are events which can safely be accepted as stimuli of dissension and enmity, if only because they are expressions or consequences of an already existing disunity and enmity. It cannot be the intention to leave them unmentioned. . . . The deliberate lie of silence is the worst of all lies. Although by the end of 1954 the colonial press-censorship law had been repealed, the plethora of scurrilous accusations against leading political figures in a number of newspapers caused some groups to demand the reimposition of some censorship ordinance. In June, 1954, the cabinet submitted a new law to the provisional parliament ending certain censorship restrictions inherited from the colonial period, but other censorship laws remained in effect despite parliamentary efforts to nullify them. Previous to that time the government had indicated more than once that it favored in principle some degree of continuous official Indonesia: Paradoxes of Independence 321 control over public communications. The Sastroamijojo Cabinet has forbidden the circulation of newspapers opposed to its policies among prisoners of war taken in the South Moluccan and West Java insur­ rections. In Sulawesi (Celebes), where officially a state of siege exists because of the activities of bands of Muslim extremists, the newspaper Tindjauan> published in the city of Makassar, was recently ordered by the military commandant of the territory to close down, after it published a statement that the Indonesian defense minister was in the pay of the Red Chinese embassy. Virtually the entire Indonesian press, both those in favor of the present cabinet...

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.... The author substantiates some often heard but poorly documented rumors (particularly concerning American in­ volvement in the revolts) and amplifies information already known. However, for understanding this highly complex and confusing period of modem Indonesian political history Birds Nests...

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... employed in the Middle East, Indonesians in the Middle East and Asia, Nepalese and Indians in the Middle East, Latin Americans in Europe and the United States, and Ukranians and Moldovians in Western Europe. In this article, we examine the migration and employ- ment conditions of migrant domestic...

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